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**SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES**

No 2, February-March 1989

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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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## Sociological Studies

No 2, February-March 1989

[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

### INTERETHNIC RELATIONS: TOWARD THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

#### Trends in Ethnolinguistic Development

18060006A Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Feb-Mar 89  
(signed to press 17 Apr 89) pp 3-13

[Article by Ya.Z. Garipov: "Trends in Ethnolinguistic Development"; Yagfar Zakirovich Garipov is a candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate at the Kazan State Pedagogical Institute. Our journal has published his articles: "Research on the Process of the Development of Factual Equality of Nations in the USSR in the 1920s-1930s" (No 4, 1977), "Constructing a Typology for Nationality-Administrative Territories With the Aid of a Machine Classification" (No 3, 1979, with co-author) and "Analysis of Factors in the Spread of Bilingualism in the USSR" (No 3, 1980, as co-author)]

[Text] The present-day nationality-linguistic situation in our country is characterized by a profound and complete interaction of all languages as well as by the broad spread of nationality-Russian bilingualism among the population. As was pointed out in the new wording of the CPSU Program, the party in the future will ensure the free and equal development and use of mother tongues. At the same time, the mastery of Russian along with the language of one's nationality, broadens access to the scientific and technical achievements of domestic and world culture [1].

On the ethnosociological level, by nationality-linguistic (ethnolinguistic) development of the population, one understands the functional development of languages and their interaction in real verbal conduct of persons from different nationalities in all spheres of vital activity. The given work, on the basis of the materials of the All-Union Population Censuses of 1959, 1970 and 1979, analyzes the degree of distribution of a second language among the indigenous population of the national republics and oblasts, the establishing of one of the languages as the mother tongue as well as the relationship of these processes.

All the USSR population censuses included indicators of nationality and mother tongue while in 1970 and 1979, the programs were supplemented with the question of the free mastery of a second language by the USSR

peoples. Over the 9 years (1970-1979), the number of the bilingual population rose by 21.5 million persons. Among them 90 percent mentioned Russian as the second language which they had mastered freely. Thus, the leading trend is the spread of nationality-Russian bilingualism. The total number of the population which had mastered Russian (including also the Russians) increased over this time from 76 percent to 82 percent.

According to the data of the 1979 census, 80.8 percent of the non-Russian population of the nation lives in the Union republics. Consequently, the overall trends in the nation's linguistic development to a decisive degree are determined by the scale of the distribution of bilingualism here. From 1970 through 1979, the size of the non-Russian population in the Union republics increased by 11.5 percent, while the share of persons with a free mastery of Russian as a second language rose by 58.6 percent. Spreading further along with Russian as a second language which is freely mastered by the population of the Union republics have been the languages of the indigenous nationalities in these republics. In 1979, in addition to the Ukrainians themselves, 7 million representatives of other nationalities named Ukrainian as a second language which they were fluent in, 1.5 million persons mentioned Belorussian, 679,000 gave Uzbek and 287,000 persons mentioned Azeri, Tatar, Moldavian, Tajik, Georgian and other languages have also spread beyond the limits of their own ethnoses.

At the present stage, a major objective factor which differentiates the development of the nationality-Russian bilingualism is the ethnic environment and primarily the share of Russians in the region's population. Also of great importance is the subjective factor, that is, the nationality-linguistic policy of the CPSU and the work of the state and social organizations aimed at establishing favorable conditions for equal linguistic development for all the nations and nationalities of our country. A key element in linguistic policy is the national school, the language of preschool training and education as well as school and vocational education.

The proportional amount of the Russian people varies strongly according to the different national republics and oblasts. According to 1979 data, in the population of the Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijan and Lithuanian SSRs, Russians comprise from 2.3 percent to 8.9 percent, while in Latvia they are 32.8 percent and in Kazakhstan 40.8 percent. Due to historically determined settlement of the peoples, the share of the Russian population in the Union republics as a whole is significantly less than in the national autonomous areas of the RSFSR.

If we examine the population by age cohorts, it is discovered that here also nationality-Russian bilingualism has developed differently. In 1970, the share of bilingual persons in the group under the age of 10 in the peoples comprising the Union republics was 9.3 percent, while those forming the autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts were 30.7 percent. In the age cohort under the age of 10, the influence of the school on the

spread of bilingualism is still insignificant and this difference (21.4 percent) to a decisive degree is determined by differences in the ethnic milieu as well as by the language of preschool training and education. Due to the above-mentioned factors, the ethnic structure of the autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts provides significantly greater opportunities for acquainting the indigenous nationalities with Russian. In the nationality areas, a prevailing portion of the Russian population lives in towns and cities. Among the urban population of the national autonomous areas of the RSFSR, indigenous nationalities represent a relative minority. Due to intense interethnic contacts in everyday life and intercourse in preschool institutions, an absolute majority of the children from the indigenous nationalities in the cities of the autonomous republics and oblasts of the RSFSR even before school have virtually mastered a passable Russian fluency.

In comparison with the previous age group, the greatest increase in the share of bilingual persons is found in the cohort of 11-19 year-olds: in the Union republics some 38.2 percent and in the autonomous areas 44.6 percent. Along with the ethnic milieu, this group shows most completely the impact of secondary and partially the higher school.

A diversity in types of the functional interaction of the national languages and the language of interethnic communication corresponds to the present stage in the linguistic development of the population in the national republics and oblasts. Although there is no generally accepted meaning for the term "bilingualism," by this one understands a more or less equal mastery of two languages or a perfect knowledge of both the truly maternal tongue as well as a second language, that is, the knowledge and use of two languages in verbal activity. The attention of researchers more often has been focused on the spread of Russian in breadth and depth. The factors contributing to the acquiring of a mother tongue by the indigenous population of the national republics are assumed to be somehow set previously and constant in time. Such an approach overlooks the questions of the actual ensuring of the free development and equal use of mother tongues by all the citizens of the nation and the problems of the linkage of a national language and national culture, the not declared but truly equal interaction of mother and interethnic languages primarily in the sphere of education.

Having refuted the previous thesis on the lack of problems in the nationality processes, the 27th CPSU Congress established conditions making it possible to view the sphere of nationality relations not as a "zone of universal harmony" but rather as a living, diverse process of interaction between the national and international where the progressive also makes headway through contradictions [2]. At present, the questions of linguistic equality are being sharply debated in the sphere of school education and the limited opportunities for learning in the mother tongue for a portion of the population of the indigenous nationalities in a number

of republics. In the cities of the national autonomous areas of the RSFSR by the mid-1960s and the cities of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kirghizia, Latvia and certain other republics over the last 15 years, there has been a sharp drop in the number of schools teaching in the national language. Instruction in the mother tongue for children of indigenous nationalities studying in Russian schools is essentially carried out formally (for example, 2 hours a week and often as an elective in Bashkiria and Tataria). Due to the virtual absence of national minority nurseries in the cities of a number of republics, a predominant majority of the children admitted to school has no knowledge of the mother tongue. For example, with more than a million persons in the capital of Tataria, there are just one national minority school and one nursery with 120-150 places. A similar picture is found in Naberezhnye Chelny with a population of 500,000. Only last year, considering the results of a polling of parents, was instruction in the Tatar language introduced in 12 schools of Kazan and 7 in Naberezhnye Chelny. A total of 35 urban schools provide instruction in Tatar. The number of preschool institutions with groups studying the mother tongue has risen from 16 to 400 [3].

The converting of the Tatar schools to instruction in Russian is carried out at the request of the parents. In actuality, the parents are very willing for their children to be taught in Russian. For completely understandable reasons, they want to see their children educated, but in a predominant majority of the VUZes and technical schools, instruction is carried out in Russian. For example, in the 13 VUZes and 62 special secondary schools of the Tatar ASSR, including the pedagogical institutes and schools, less than 1 percent of the students study in Tatar (teachers of the native language and literature, journalists and philologists). Of the 122 vocational-technical schools [PTU], only one rural PTU provides instruction in Tatar. Under such conditions the parents become convinced that for a knowledge of Russian on a level sufficient for obtaining a vocational education and particularly a higher and specialized secondary one, it is essential to teach the children in Russian from the very beginning. In the understanding of an absolute majority of the parents, to learn in Russian and to study Russian are the same concepts [4]. Although it is clear that in the cities, with a Russian-speaking ethnic milieu, with a mass study of Russian in the schools, it is possible to completely master the interethnic language and study in the mother tongue in the national minority school.

Of the 1.7 million of the Tatar population of the Tatar ASSR, around one-half lives in villages where instruction is provided predominantly in the native tongue. Among students of the republic VUZes, from the beginning of the 1980s, the ratio of Tatars and Russians was equal and in the technical schools the share of Tatars was 7-10 percent greater. Consequently, there are no grounds to speak of things askew in the obtaining of a higher and specialized secondary education by the urban and rural

Tatars and caused exclusively by a "school" language. Certain differences in the structure of opportunities are actually determined by social factors since at present the rural school as a whole is inferior to the urban one. It is not an issue of any demarcation of "spheres of influence" of native and international languages in the system of vocational education, although it is natural to train the teachers of the nationality childrens preschool institutions, instructors in the national minority schools and cultural and art workers in the native tongue. The purely pragmatic attitude existing among the population toward linguistic development and oriented solely at obtaining a vocational education and particularly a higher one contributes to a sort of alienation of the individual from the native tongue and hence from the national minority culture. In the towns of the national republics it is important to ensure real conditions for the children of the indigenous nationalities to gain access to their native tongue from the earliest age.

The sharp restriction in the functions of the native tongue in urban schools is reflected on the development of national minority literature and theater. Of the 45 members of the writer organization in the Tatar ASSR and born in the 1940s and 50s and writing in Tatar, only 3 received a secondary education in an urban school [5]. Among the actors of the republic Tatar theaters, only 30 percent completed urban schools while in the Russian theaters the figure was 95 percent. The urban youth of the indigenous nationality due to the ignorance of their native tongue are virtually deprived of an opportunity in participating in replenishing the ranks of the national minority creative intelligentsia. In the Tatar ASSR one other circumstance makes the linguistic problem acute. The republic's indigenous population had to go through two reforms in writing: in 1927 and 1939. As a result, the writing based on the Arabic alphabet and which had served the Tatar culture for more than a thousand years was abolished. The rich manuscript heritage and books published from 1612 through 1939 as well as sets of newspapers and magazines of over 300 titles were virtually inaccessible for the subsequent generations [6]. A situation arose where the middle generation of Tatars did not know the writing of their elders while in the cities a majority of the youth was alienated not only from the writing but also from the language of the elder generation. The linkage of ages was broken as well as the

succession of cultural traditions. For ensuring real Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism at present, it should be a question not only of a knowledge of the native language but also in many instances creating a fully functioning integrated system of education in this language as well as education in the history and culture of one's people.


The census materials do not provide an opportunity to judge the degree to which the population has mastered a native tongue. In the 1959, 1970 and 1979 censuses, the question of a native tongue is asked not so much for determining the real knowledge and use of a language as it is as a category of ethnic self-awareness of the person being questioned (the language which the person himself considers to be his native one). Over the 20 years, the size of the non-Russian population considering the language of another nationality as its native one has risen by 6.3 million and reached almost 18 million persons, and 90.5 percent of them consider Russian their native tongue.

In using regression analysis with categorial variables [7], let us examine the dependence of the share of individuals of indigenous nationalities who are fluent in Russian as a second language ( $y_1$ ) and those considering Russian their native language ( $y_2$ ) upon the share of the Russian population living in the national oblasts ( $x_1$ ) as well as the closeness of the relationship of these two indicators. As a unit of analysis we have taken the population of the nationality-administrative territories on the oblast level. The republics which do not have such divisioning are viewed as one object. In the RSFSR, as such objects we have used the autonomous republics, oblasts and districts. As a result, the examined list consists of 106 oblast objects for the 1959 file, 113 for 1970 and 120 for 1979.

The regression equations for the dependence of  $y_1$  and  $y_2$  upon  $x_1$  as well as  $y_2$  upon  $y_1$  have been calculated for two versions of the set of observations: a) all oblast objects included in the analysis; b) qualitatively homogeneous aggregates of objects remaining after excluding the extremal areas established as a result of the typology. The uniform 1979 file is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. The multiple correlation coefficients ( $R$ ) as well as the determination coefficients ( $D=R^2$ ) designating the share of the explained variation are given in Table 1. The correlations between variables for uniform aggregates (variation b) are given in Fig. 3.

Table 1. Multiple Correlation Coefficients and Determination Coefficients

variations of observations		R/Y <sub>1</sub>	D/Y-Y <sup>2</sup> /Y <sub>1</sub>	R/Y <sub>2</sub>	D/Y <sub>2</sub> -Y <sup>2</sup> /Y <sub>2</sub>	R/Y <sub>2</sub> Y <sub>1</sub>	D/Y <sub>2</sub> Y <sub>1</sub> =R <sup>2</sup> /Y <sub>2</sub> Y <sub>1</sub>
1959	a)			0.582	0.339		
	b)			0.695	0.484		
1970	a)	0.706	0.498	0.622	0.387	0.225	0.051
	b)	0.836	0.699	0.752	0.565	0.356	0.127
1979	a)	0.630	0.397	0.666	0.443	0.230	0.053
	b)	0.758	0.575	0.806	0.650	0.361	0.130




**Fig. 1.** Dependence of share of persons of indigenous nationality fluent in Russian and considering Russian the native tongue upon the share of Russians in the population for all objects, except the oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia. Key: ●—fluent in Russian in Union republics; ▽—in autonomous areas; ○—considering Russian the native tongue in Union republics; ▼—in autonomous areas.

Both linguistic indicators of the censuses are closely linked with the share of the Russian population in the corresponding oblasts. For the 1970 uniform file of objects the variable  $x_1$ —the share of the Russian population—explains 69.9 percent ( $R^2 \times 100$ ) of variation  $y_1$  and 56.5 percent of variation  $y_2$ . For the 1979 file, analogous indicators equal 57.5 and 65 percent. A comparison of the two trends in the linguistic development of the population indicates that they as a whole are moving in the same direction: in oblasts with a high share of persons fluent in Russian as a second language there is also a significant share of persons of the indigenous nationality who consider Russian their native tongue. At the same time, there is a complexity and specific feature to the linkage of these

two trends as is shown by the insignificant correlation coefficients between  $y_2$  and  $y_1$  (0.356 for the 1970 file and 0.361 for the 1979).

Clearly there is a definite linkage between the fluent mastery of a second language and the recognition of this language as the native one. However, this is in no way rectilinear and often the recognition of another language as a native one can be viewed as the "extreme point in the development of bilingualism," as a natural result of a more profound, qualitative mastery of a second language by the individual. In a predominant majority of instances, a person over his life does not change his notion of a native language. A change in the native language and an unique



**Fig. 2.** Dependence of share of persons of indigenous nationality with fluent mastery of Russian and considering Russian their native tongue upon share of Russians in population of Ukrainian and Belorussian oblasts.

Key: ■--fluent in Russian in medium-urbanized oblasts; □--in highly urbanized oblasts; Δ--considering Russian their native tongue.

jump in the linguistic development of the population occur in the changing of generations.

In the materials of the 1970 census, let us compare the linguistic indicators by age groups. In the age category under the age of 10, the share of persons mastering a second language is minimal. It is 2.5-5-fold less than in the group of 11-19 years. At the same time, the share of persons who consider the language of another nationality as their native one in this age group (with the exception of the Estonians) is one of the highest and among the Russians, Lithuanians, Moldavians and Latvians it is completely the maximum. In an absolute majority of people who consider the language not of their nationality to be

their native language, the change in the native language occurred in childhood, before the age of 10. This means that in a family the language used among the members did not coincide with the nationality of the child. This situation is most often observed in the mixed nationality families.

The dependences or diagrams for the dispersion of the share of the population considering the language of another nationality as their native language (y) and the share of mixed nationality families (x) according to the data of the 1959, 1970 and 1979 censuses are shown in Figs. 4 and 5.




Fig. 3. Graphs of correlations




Fig. 4. Dependence of share of persons considering the language of another nationality as their native tongue upon share of mixed nationality families (1970).

Key: ●—Union republics; ▽—autonomous republics and oblasts.

The regression equations linking the variables  $x$  and  $y$  assume the form:


1959	$y=0.156+0.509x$ ( $R=0.706$ ; $R^2=0.499$ )
1970	$y=-1.213+0.481x$ ( $R=0.817$ ; $R^2=0.668$ )
1979	$y=-2.111+0.550x$ ( $R=0.813$ ; $R^2=0.662$ )

The distribution of children from mixed marriages by nationality and native language of the parents depends upon many specific conditions. However, in the mixed nationality families formed by nationalities which are ethnically related and close in language and culture, the surmounting of the psychological barrier arising with a difference in the native language and nationality occurs significantly easier. In the republics and oblasts where peoples who are similar in language and culture live together and in the mixed nationality marriages there is a predominance of marriages between them, the share of persons recognizing the language

of the other nationality as the native one will be significantly higher. In the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Bashkir ASSR, the basic portion of the interethnic families is made up of, respectively, Russian-Ukrainian, Belorussian-Russian, Bashkir-Tatar families, that is, there are marriages between peoples close in language. Consequently, these objects introduce a qualitative heterogeneity relative to the dependence studied by us (in Figs. 4 and 5, the designated object are shown by U, B and Bash). The exclusion of them from the analyzed data files improves the regression models:

1959	$y=0.570+0.412x$ ( $R=0.856$ ; $R^2=0.732$ )
1970	$y=-1.184+0.442x$ ( $R=0.913$ ; $R^2=0.834$ )
1979	$y=-1.169+0.483x$ ( $R=0.909$ ; $R^2=0.826$ )

Due to the insignificant numbers and the particular features of settlement as well as the specific national features of the indigenous nationalities of Siberia, the



**Fig. 5.** Dependence of share of persons considering language of another nationality as their native tongue upon share of mixed nationality families by Union republics (1959, 1979). Key: ●—1959; ○—1979.

North and Far East, the file of 10 autonomous districts (1970) has been examined separately:  $y = -3.506 + 0.591x$  ( $R=0.932$ ;  $R^2=0.869$ ).

In uniform files of objects, the variable  $x$ —the share of mixed nationality families—explains from 73.2 to 86.9 percent of the variation or variability in variable  $y$  or the share of persons with a discrepancy in nationality and native tongue. The conclusion is confirmed that at the present stage of the ethnolinguistic processes the crucial factor which determines the change of a native language is the mixed nationality marriages.

According to the 1979 data, over 90 percent of the non-Russian population considering the language not of their nationality as their native tongue indicated Russian as the native one. The share of the non-Russian population considering Russian as their native tongue is basically determined by the scale of the distribution of mixed nationality marriages. And these are encountered most often among urban dwellers and are closely tied to the share of the urban population in the national republics. It is possible to assume a direct influence of the share of the Russians on linguistic changes. In other words, the higher the proportional amount of Russians in the republic population, the higher the number of persons here who have mastered Russian as a second language and, as a consequence, the more persons recognizing


Russian as their native language. However, if the proportional amount of persons who have switched to Russian ( $y_2$ ) is related to the share of Russians ( $x_1$ ), it has virtually no correlation with  $y_1$  or the share of persons who are fluent in Russian as a second language. Then one can speak about an indirect influence of the share of Russians on the processes of linguistic crosses through interethnic marriages, that is, the higher the number of interethnic marriages with the involvement of Russians, the higher the share of the non-Russian population considering Russian as their native tongue.

The hypothesis of an indirect influence was checked out using causal analysis.<sup>2</sup> The standardized (normed) variables incorporated in the causal model are:  $Z_1$ —the share of persons of non-Russian nationality considering Russian their native tongue;  $Z_2$ —the share of mixed nationality families;  $Z_3$ —the share of Russians;  $Z_4$ —the share of the urban population. The structure of the linkages of the variables obtained on the basis of content analysis is shown in Fig. 6.

The statistical model is a system of two regression equations:

$$\begin{aligned} Z_1 &= \beta_1 Z_3 + \beta_2 Z_2 \\ Z_2 &= \beta_3 Z_3 + \beta_4 Z_4 \end{aligned}$$

The first equation expresses the direct (immediate) influence on  $Z_1$  of the variables  $Z_3$  and  $Z_2$ , the second shows

**Fig. 6**

the influence on  $Z_2$  of variables  $Z_3$  and  $Z_4$ . The direct influence of one variable on another is measured by the standard regression coefficient for this variable:  $P^{\pi}_{31} = \beta_1$ . The direct causal influence equals the product of the direct influences:  $P^K_{31} = P_{32}P_{21} = \beta_3\beta_2$ .

A solving of the equations on the basis of the 1937 data (37 units of analysis of the Union and autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts) provides the following results:

$$(Z_1 = 0.05Z_3 + 0.86Z_2)$$

$$(Z_2 = 0.21Z_3 + 0.47Z_4)$$

$P^{\pi}_{31} = 0.05$ ;  $P^K_{31} = 0.21 \times 0.86 = 0.18$ . The direct influence of the variable  $Z_3$  on  $Z_1$  is not significant. Valid is a model in which it is absent:

$$(Z_1 = 0.87Z_2)$$

$$(Z_2 = 0.21Z_3 + 0.47Z_4)$$

**Table 2. Share of Mixed Nationality Families and Its Correlation With the Share of Persons Who Consider the Language of Another Nationality as Their Native Tongue**

Census Year	Share of Mixed Nationality Families			Correlation Coefficients		
	Total	City	Rural	Total Population	City	Rural
1959	10.2	15.1	5.8	0.706	0.838	0.736
1970	13.5	17.5	7.9	0.817	0.824	0.784
1979	14.9	18.1	9.2	0.813	0.735	0.820

The linguistic milieu and the factors which shape the transition to another language of a nonindigenous population in the national republics and oblasts change insignificantly. But the substantial narrowing of the functions of native languages in the educational system of the republic urban population and, in particular, the population of the national autonomous areas and the reduced opportunities for the indigenous population to become accustomed to the native language lead to a situation where there are more frequent instances of a difference in nationality and native language in single-nationality families of the indigenous population. The share of persons who have changed their native language in such families becomes marked and is now apparent on

In assuming the significance of the designated dependences between the variables in a time interval (1959-1979), a model has been obtained on an aggregate file of objects of 1959 and 1979 (30 units of analysis—the Union republics):

$$(Z_1 = -0.01Z_3 + 0.86Z_2)$$

$$(Z_2 = 0.17Z_3 + 0.15Z_4)$$

$$P^{\pi}_{31} = 0.02; P^K_{31} = 0.17 \times 0.86 = 0.15.$$

In this instance the direct influence of  $Z_3$  on  $Z_1$  can be disregarded. The causal model is valid as follows:

$$(Z_1 = 0.85Z_2)$$

$$(Z_2 = 0.17Z_3 + 0.15Z_4)$$

Confirmation is provided for the hypothesis on the decisive significance of the indirect influence of the share of Russians on the linguistic changeovers of the non-Russian population, that is, through their involvement in interethnic marriages. At the current stage of linguistic development, the share of the non-Russian population which considers Russian its native tongue to a decisive degree depends upon the distribution of mixed nationality marriages with the involvement of Russians. The share of mixed nationality marriages has risen from census to census both among the urban and the rural population. However, the influence of this factor on the scale of the transition of the population to different nationality languages varies: it diminishes in the towns and rises in the countryside. This is seen from the direction of the changes in the correlation coefficients between the shares of mixed marriages in the national republics and oblasts and the share of persons who consider the language of a different nationality their native tongue (Table 2).

the statistical level. Simultaneously in the 1970s, there was a slow-down in the increase in mixed nationality marriages among urban dwellers and this also contributed to a decline in the influence of interethnic marriages on the changing of the native tongue by the urban population.

Among the rural population of the republics, the share of mixed marriages has risen from census to census significantly faster than among the urban population. At the same time, in the countryside there has been a decline in the proportional amount of the population of nonindigenous nationality and among whom one most frequently encounters instances of a change of native tongue in single-nationality families.

Often interethnic marriages are mentioned as among the factors which influence a spread of the processes of bilingualism. Let us isolate two groups of the non-Russian population: the first which consider the language of their nationality as the native one and the second those who consider the language of another nationality as their native one. The number of the latter group, as we have made clear, is basically determined by the number of mixed nationality marriages. Let us compare the scale of distribution of bilingualism in these groups of the population. In the first in 1970, 45.2 percent of the population had completely mastered a second language (most often Russian) and in 1979, the figure was 59.8 percent of the population. In the second group, those who were fluent in the language of their nationality as a second language were, respectively, 26.5 and 27.2 percent, that is, here bilingual persons were much fewer than in the first group. Consequently, although it is possible to assume a certain influence of interethnic families on the assimilation of a second language, however, they are in no way an independently significant factor for the spread of bilingualism. The mastery of a second language is chiefly linked to the ethnic milieu, the preschool facilities, the secondary and higher school. This is shown from the fact that according to the 1970 data, in the second group the share of bilingual persons in the city was 30.5 percent and in the countryside, just 13.8 percent. It must be pointed out that approximately 3 out of 4 who consider the language of another nationality as their native one have not mastered their own language, that is, the transition in a majority of instances has involved the loss of the language of one's own nationality.

Nationality-Russian bilingualism is the main direction of linguistic development for the USSR population. However, bilingual nations or nationalities should not be reduced to a linguistic situation where one part of it living in the countryside speaks predominantly in the native nationality language and the other, the urban, in the international one. The complete mastery of both languages, that is, real general bilingualism meets the needs of the equal development of a multinational population. Undoubtedly, the legal equality of languages does not mean a complete identification of their social functions but it does presuppose the factual ensuring of equal rights.

At present, there must be a more careful regionalization of the tasks of nationality-linguistic development. In a number of republics, as before, there actually are the spread of Russian, the improved quality of its teaching, particularly among the rural population of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and Estonia. At the same time, in the cities of the Ukraine, Belorussian, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and the autonomous republics and oblasts of the RSFSR, the most important aspect of the linguistic problem is linked to the mastery of the true native tongue by the representatives of the indigenous nationalities. It is also essential to more fully consider and satisfy the requests

in the sphere of the language of nonindigenous national groups living in the population of the Union and autonomous republics.

#### Footnote

1. All calculations of the regression equations and the causal models have been carried out by K.D. Argunova. For the methods in greater detail see [8].

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## DISCUSSIONS

### Drug Addiction From Viewpoint of Sociologist, Physician, Lawyer, Journalist

18060006B Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Feb-Mar 89  
(signed to press 17 Apr 89) pp 38-51

[Roundtable discussion prepared by K.A. Shchadilova: "Drug Addiction From the Viewpoint of a Sociologist, Physician, Lawyer and Journalist"]

[Text] There is no need to convince anyone of how important it is now to have a careful study of the sociodemographic characteristics of drug addicts and the reasons which impel people to use drugs, the living conditions, their social environment and the "geography," pace and scale of the spread of this calamity. It is also important to work out the main principles of

antidrug propaganda and preventive measures and provide the necessary "interlocking" of organizational, legal, medical, educational and other measures aimed at preventing and eradicating drug addiction. These and other questions were at the center of a roundtable discussion held by the editors of the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA.

Participating in the discussion were: co-workers from the Laboratory for Sociopsychological Research of Drug Addiction of the All-Union Scientific Center for Drug Studies of the USSR Minzdrav [Ministry of Health]; the laboratory head and Doctor of Psychological Sciences, V.V. Guldan and Senior Science Associate and Candidate of Psychological Sciences, O.L. Romanova; the Head of the Specialized Department of the Narcological Hospital No. 17 in Moscow, A.G. Danilin; the Department Chief at the Main Directorate of Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Police Col V.V. Kapustin; the Instructor at the Moscow Higher Police School of the USSR MVD, Candidate of Economic Sciences, O.V. Osipenko; the Junior Science Assistant and Police Capt B.F. Kalachev, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Chief of the Tbilisi Scientific Research Laboratory, A.A. Gabiani; candidate of juridical sciences, Sr Science Associate of the VNII [All-Union Scientific Research Institute] of the USSR MVD, I.Ya. Vilks; the Senior Literary Associate on the journal MOLODOY KOMMUNIST, S.M. Artyukhov; the journalist A.M. Presman; the scientific editor of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, K.A. Shchadilova. The discussion was run by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences and Scientific Consultant of the Journal, A.I. Kravchenko. [End of Introduction]

**A.I. Kravchenko:** Assembled here today are representatives of different professions including lawyers, physicians, sociologists and journalists who in one way or another are involved with the social problems of drug addiction. In the course of the discussion each is to be granted an opportunity to describe in detail those difficulties which arise in studying this complex phenomenon and the tasks which are now being solved in the field. In order not to try to do the impossible, I would request that A.M. Presman who has provided us great help in organizing the roundtable outline generally the state of the problem.

#### A Fatally Dangerous State of Mind of an Official

**A.M. Presman:** In one issue last year of the journal OGONEK they put it well: we have recently made an amazing discovery, we have discovered drug addiction. That this had existed for a long time was completely unknown to the broad public. There is the other question that at present the process of the spread of drug addiction has become particularly intense and this can be seen not only in our nation but throughout the world. The situation in our nation for long years was exacerbated by the complete silence of both the mass information media as well as the social scientists.

**From the floor:** But that is not the fault of either. During the years of stagnation, home-grown drug addiction was elevated to the rank of a state secret. It was strictly prohibited to even mention it in the press by the corresponding instructions of the Minzdrav.

**A.M. Presman:** Now, it seems to me, there has been a boom in sensational articles. But the disturbing thing is that when the time has arrived for specific recommendations and decisive actions, then silence reigns. The journalists cannot propose anything constructive while the officials representing various agencies are only after their own interests. Up to now, there has been no standard approach to the problem. In my view there is an urgent need to set up an interagency coordinating and consulting body such as the Narcotics Bureau in the United States or the UN International Commission. But this is not enough. It is impossible not only to resolve the problem but even get it under control without an extensive network of mutual aid and mutual support clubs. In the West, there are analogous institutions, for example, the so-called Platini System in France and the international voluntary organization of Drug Addicts Anonymous.

Unfortunately, in 1986-1987, the response to the spread of drug addiction in our country was a standard one of increasing suppression by force. I am convinced that such an approach can only lead to the reverse effect. The law enforcement bodies which have all responsibility for the state of affairs in this area and bear the lion's share of work are simply being stifled. Throughout the world, specialists of a completely different sort from the American Attorney General R. Clark (read the book "Crime in the United States") to medical personnel have concluded that the major thing here is prevention and maintaining what is called the "quality of life" and secondly there is medicine and treatment and thirdly the activities of the law enforcement bodies and the latter should extend only to the system of manufacturing the drugs, their distribution, marketing, speculation, smuggling and so forth.

**A.I. Kravchenko:** If I have understood you correctly, in former not so distant years, the main problem was a lack of glasnost and now it is one of isolation and uncoordinated actions by those concerned with this problem?

**A.M. Presman:** As a whole, yes. It is time to move away from a narrow agency approach in splitting up the problems, like a carcass of meat, into parts. But one must not think that glasnost alone here will put everything in order as there still are numerous problems....

**S.M. Artyukhov:** I encountered these just a few days ago. Our material was being prepared at a publishing house. The editor was critical of us: too many descriptions, there was excessive detail in describing the state of euphoria, too much room was given to what the drug addicts feel, there is no reason to divide them into various groups, from the more elite circle to the heavy

abusers and so forth. All of this was mercilessly emphasized. Here the editor referred to the instructions of the Minzgrav. This seemed to me fundamentally wrong. The Minzgrav should settle the questions of a medical sort and related to working out treatments, the adaptation of man, diagnosis, rehabilitation and so forth. The fact of how a reader will receive one or another article is outside the competence of a physician.

**From the floor:** According to certain estimates, 80 percent of the juveniles became familiar with drugs out of a curiosity caused by articles in the press and by excessive conversations on this question.

**A.A. Gabiani:** In Georgia I have conducted two studies devoted to the development of drug addiction in the republic. The first was commenced in 1967 and completed at the beginning of the 1970s and the second was carried out 15 years later. Later I will describe in detail the obtained results and now I would like to point out that, according to our data, among the reasons leading to the trying of narcotics the actually dominant one is a desire to experience a feeling of euphoria but here the role of "tempters" was played not by publications but chiefly by friends and acquaintances. What articles could there have been in the second half of the 1960s? At that time, in domestic journals and newspapers one not only did not encounter a description of narcotic euphoria but there were not even any lines at all about drug addicts in our nation. The number of persons involved in drugs, incidentally, has steadily risen. I am well aware of what inventiveness is shown by experienced addicts in order to arouse an interest in drugs among a novice and what strong psychological pressure they apply.

**S.M. Artyukhov:** Why are drugs attractive and how does man fall into the trap? We say nothing about this. We merely speak of the severe consequences and the addiction. We emphasize the fact that even one puff, one needle can be fatal. That may be the case but certainly one frequently encounters a situation where a person after one or two tries does not feel any dependency. Then he does not believe what we write as we certainly are not examining the entire delicate mechanism of action of the drug and we say nothing of its attractiveness. Hence, all the rest is lies and this means that one can continue to "get high" without any fear. This is how a drug catches you and it catches you hard.

**O.L. Romanova:** We have also encountered this in studying juveniles from 10 to 17 years of age in an ordinary secondary school in Moscow. We were studying how the notion of drug addiction and substance abuse changed with age. The children have the same sources including the television set, books, the press and radio. It turned out that in the structure of the notion which is shaped on the basis of these sources there is everything except subjective sensations and virtually nothing is said about these. And as soon as you do mention them, the children begin to be interested. And since that information which the juvenile gains from the newspapers, books, films, TV and radio broadcasts is missing at the

given moment, he endeavors to fill in the "gap." According to our observations, a most active interest in this aspect of drug consumption appears, as a rule, somewhere in 6th grade. Under the influence of stories of comrades and older children, the notion is developed of drugs as something attractive and pleasant. In the 8th-10th grades, such judgments were voiced by a majority of those polled. Incidentally, among the children questioned by us from the so-called experimental group which included those who had already, so to speak, gained sad experience and had been placed in a clinic, 75 percent described negative sensations.

**A.M. Presman:** Any silence or gap in the information causes mistrust of the propaganda.

**O.L. Romanova:** When we did propose to a group of 8th graders to write short stories and fill out the situation describing the subjective sensations after the taking of drugs, we obtained real parodies of our propaganda and the children not without a jeer resorted to the usual cries in such instances: they described the breaking of windows, conflicts with a policeman and so forth.

**A.M. Presman:** In front of me are two booklets published in 1988, the first by a Polish author, S. Gursky, entitled "Attention—Drug Addiction!" and by L. Bogdanovich "Belyy uzhas" [White Terror]. The first study is remarkable but then there is the postscript by E.A. Babayan.... The main idea is that since a drug addict is a criminal, he must be prosecuted. And this is a physician speaking.... Even children laugh at the second booklet. A young girl in a "zapped" state and a boy in a state of corruption. Of course, this is all quite true but it has been so castrated that it has completely the reverse effect.

**A.G. Danilin:** I would comment that physicians should not be concerned with antidrug propaganda. We are directly involved with drug addicts. This contingent is diverse. I am a supporter of the psychological approach and have adhered to it in my work for many years. I feel that the propaganda should be differentiated. For example, a physician who is not acquainted with the works of C. Castaneda or J.C. Lilly who preach a drug cult can scarcely be concerned with mystic drug addicts, a rather elite and self-contained group. They use very complex drugs, the procedure of taking is accompanied by mystic rituals which, incidentally, are amazing beautiful. If I have no notion of those profoundly spiritual, philosophical systems which, in truth, in a truncated form underlie many forms of dependent behavior, including the mystic drug addicts, I could scarcely count on their trust. And without this the effect of the propaganda is virtually zero.

**M.A. Presman:** Here empty mysticism and charlatanism can be very dangerous.

**A.G. Danilin:** It is all the most important then to correctly organize the work. Children and juveniles require their own approach and a knowledge of child psychology. But in any instance the main thing is a high professional level. In my view, it is completely essential

to set up special organizations, let us call them, for instance, bureaus, which would be concerned with the questions of professionalizing the antidrug propaganda. Anyone concerned with this now has nowhere to gain the required materials and there is no one to consult with. Everything must be done with the aid of acquaintances by telephoning one another. Certainly this is a very serious area and here we must be able to understand the fine points of psychological, psychotherapeutic approaches and have some notion of certain philosophical views, meditation and so forth.

**V.V. Guldan:** Olga Lvovna Romanova has spoken here about a study of children in the 4th-10th grades in one of the Moscow schools. I would like to give some specific figures on this study. The children mentioned several sources of information on drug addiction and substance abuse. In first place were films and TV broadcasts. These were mentioned by 50 percent of the 12-13-year-olds, by 38 percent of the 14-15-year-olds and 38 percent of the 16-17-year-old juveniles. This was followed by newspapers, magazines and books (respectively, 25, 23 and 33 percent). Some 12.5, 18 and 12 percent in each of the isolated groups of persons questioned had learned about narcotics and toxic substances from adults and, respectively, 12.5, 18 and 19 percent from comrades. Among the 12 and 13-year-olds, in their words, they had no personal experience but in the following age group this question was answered affirmatively by 10 percent of the children and among the older students already 20 percent.

**A.M. Presman:** Excuse my interruption but I cannot help but draw attention to one interesting circumstance. According to my observations, juveniles often assert that they had tried drugs although in actuality this was merely fibbing for the sake of prestige. The same thing holds true, for example, when it is a matter of sexual life. Of course, in order to establish the truth, it is essential to carry out a personal conversation but I would assert that such instances are not isolated.

**V.V. Guldan:** Actually an interesting comment. Incidentally, none of our respondents was either in the basic or preventive treatment reporting but from 10 to 35 percent of the young people (depending upon age) stated that they had tried a drug or toxic substance at least once. Even more alarming are the data concerning friends and acquaintances who have similar experience as their circle increases sharply with age. The questionnaire was an autonomous one and it seems to me that here there would scarcely be any "bragging" out of prestige considerations. However the case, the given figures are cause for reflection and, in particular, particularly those concerning forecasting the effects of antidrug propaganda. The World Health Organization or WHO recommends: if in a nation, region or individual school there is no threatening drug situation, it is better not to initiate antidrug propaganda as this can act as a source of information, as advertising. But the question is: what situation must be considered threatening and what are the criteria here? Unfortunately, for now no one can

provide a standard answer. One thing is clear: if there is information about something then whether we want it or not, this information will still be used. Here even the "Executioner's Block" by Aytmatov for some is a warning and for others is a sort of guide of how to find raw materials, process them and so forth. The question of what information there should be about drugs can be settled only on the basis of profound research. It is essential to distinguish the special publications and materials for the broad reader. In 1985, I was defending my views on another question but the word "drug" was mercilessly eradicated from the text. Now the situation is different but as for now it is not sufficiently clear as to what are the limits of glasnost on this question and what antidrug propaganda should be.

The speakers have already raised the problem related to motivation in turning to drugs and what was the influence for this to form. An analysis of our data disclosed a curious picture. The "effect" from the movies in young school children is expressed often in imitative games of "drug addicts" while in older students this appears in a false notion of the prestige of drug abuse. Information from adults who are not specialists in this area is oriented at intimidation and often contains an exaggerated emotional cast and excessive moralizing. Individuals of the same age discuss their personal impressions—often embellished—and primarily subjective positive sensations. Everything taken together cannot help but cause curiosity, that is, to assume motivational significance. Incidentally, the juveniles are well informed about the various drugs and toxic substances and with age the number of names familiar to them increases. Children 13-14 years of age have mentioned 15 different substances and those 16-17 years old, already 24.

**I.Ya. Vilks:** Glasnost concerning drug addiction problems is not an end in itself. The main thing is to warn the youth against the danger and divert those who are becoming involved in these things. Unfortunately, such a focus is characteristic from far from all of our publications. A recent example is the article by M. Levin in one of the recent issues of OGONEK. The incompetence of the author who describes the "myths" about drug addicts is obvious. As for antidrug propaganda, in order to carry it out correctly it is essential to have extensive information concerning the geography of the spread of drug addiction, the contingent of drug users, the methods of preparing drugs and so forth. Then it will be possible to clearly establish the trends in the development of drug addiction and feel out the sore points. It is very important, in my view, to set out the main factor—or several factors—which influence precisely the use of drugs. Apathy and poorly organized leisure largely determine deviant behavior but is this what precisely impels one to drugs?

**B.F. Kalachev:** Comrades, I feel that the problem of antidrug propaganda which we are discussing in such a lively manner would not be so acute if there had not been enormous oversights in this area in the recent past. At present, I would like to read to you two quotations which

scarcely need any commentary but first let us place all the dots over the "i's" on the very term "propaganda." As far as I understand in a most general context, this means an ideological effect on the broad masses, the propagation and complete explanation of certain ideas, knowledge or views...that is, effective information or a state-tested policy concerning a specific problem. It is from this position that I would propose in the future constructing an overall concept of the antidrug propaganda per se. And now excerpts from writings by two of our scientists at the beginning of the 1980s.

Here is what was written by Doctor of Medical Sciences I.A. Sytinskiy in the article "Alien Illness" (KHIMIYA I ZHIZN, No 10, 1980). "In our nation it is impossible to have the existence of underground firms which secretly deal in drugs and no increased consumption of marijuana is noted among the youth. However, we do have individual instances of drug addiction.... In recognition of the contributions of Soviet medicine in supervising the production and use of narcotics, in 1974, the International Edward Browning Prize was awarded to the USSR representative on the UN Commission for Narcotic Agents, E.A. Babayan, for a major contribution to combating drug addiction."

Here is a fragment from an interview with the person to whom the prize was given, the former administration chief of the USSR Minzdrav, E.A. Babayan, and chairman of the Permanent Commission on Drug Control under the USSR Minzdrav with a correspondent of the weekly NOVOYE VREM'YA (No 20, 1980). "The number of drug addicts who have been registered and undergone treatment in our country is not growing but declining. Last year we recorded around 2,700 drug addicts in comparison with slightly over 3,000 in 1978. Basically, these are chronically ill persons as well as disabled who employed morphine and codine for easing suffering and who grew addicted to them. There are also individual cases of the use of drugs made from certain wild-growing varieties of hemp...."

To a significant degree due to such brazen lies, there was at that time no financing provided for a broad struggle against the asocial phenomenon which was far from new for our country. Need it be said that such a position by "competent" persons led to thousands of deaths of supposedly nonexistent drug addicts....

Now about the current situation. According to my estimates, from May 1986 through May 1987, on the pages of the central newspapers and magazines there were around 150 articles on the problems of drug addiction, and approximately 94 of them discussed the situation in our country. At least a third of these materials was devoted to such questions as the manufacture of drugs, the state of euphoria and so forth. Certain articles very thoroughly described how the drug is produced, in what manner it was possible to deceive the police and other details, even up to the actual places where Indian hemp, the opium poppy and other drug-containing plants are grown.

The sociological studies carried out jointly with the State Inspectorate for Institutions of Higher Learning and the GUUR [Main Directorate of Criminal Investigation] of the MVD in Kiev, Moscow and Krasnodar Kray—an anonymous poll which covered over 3,000 persons—indicated that such articles evoke criticism. A negative view was given by 6 out of the 10 respondents in Kiev, by 7 out of 10 in Moscow and by a predominant majority—98 percent—in Krasnodar. The persons feared that such materials helped to fan an unhealthy curiosity and could lead to the use of a drug. Moreover, I have repeatedly heard from investigatory workers that persons involved in criminal cases as suspects refer to the newspaper and magazine articles. From here they draw information on the real possibility of earning on the drug market and without giving much thought to it, go for "raw materials" to an area which has been conscientiously described by a scribbler....

**A.M. Presman:** It is easier for an arrested person to refer to a comment in the newspaper than "put the finger" on a friend....

**B.F. Kalachev:** What can be said about the visual anti-drug agitation? Sinister posters are put out in runs of millions. Someone makes a fortune by this but is not at all concerned with the consequences of his "creativity."

**Comment from the floor:** There was a poster: "Squash drug addicts like cockroaches!" Evidently, the run was 250,000.

**B.F. Kalachev:** There are also pamphlets about bad habits. At one time I was giving a lecture in a Moscow PTU, where before the discussion a narcologist handed out these pamphlets to the students. After the students had left, piled on the floor in the empty auditorium were scraps of paper, the pamphlets.

I have brought along several samples of truly successful propaganda and agitation coming from Poland and a number of the Arab states. Have a look please and you can see that they are all vivid, lively, with an emotional impact, intelligible and, hence, serious.

Incidentally, quite recently there were some good posters published in our country. And this occurred as follows. The department chief at the MUR [Moscow Criminal Investigation] for Combating Drug Addiction, V.D. Roshchin, rejected the existing examples of large-run propaganda and at his own risk got in contact with the leadership and students of the Stroganov School. For diploma projects, he gave them an official order with a guaranteed wage. The enterprising, concerned man found, as you can see, an original way out....

Our poll showed that many young people have read the novels of Lazar Karelkin "Davy uroki" [I Give Lessons] and Chingiz Aytmatov "Plakha." Here from 46.7 to 60.6 percent of the respondents feel that the description of how drug-containing plants are grown, how the drug is manufactured, how illegal activities are concealed from the police bodies, what the users of drugs feel and so

forth arouses an unhealthy interest and a desire to try it themselves. It is worthy of note that among those who adhere to such a viewpoint, a majority is already acquainted with drugs, in other words, this is the view of "specialists"....

In my view, cinematography and music both have great, as yet unused opportunities for combating drugs. Those "multiki" [video cartoons] which are so popular with the youth could be a sensible form for showing everything that awaits the drug addict and I saw similar French and English "roliki" [tapes]. We have nothing similar. In the winter of 1987, the press and television noisily announced an international festival in Moscow under the motto "Rock Against Drugs," however, things have not yet gotten off the ground".... In a word, the current antidrug propaganda must be considered unviable.

**K.A. Shchadilova:** Our journal (No 3, 1988) published a review by the lawyers Yu.B. Leontyev, V.P. Lozbyakov and V.S. Ovchinskiy of the monograph by R.M. Gotlib, L.I. Romanova and L.P. Yatskov, where, in particular, they examine the problem of combating drug addiction. I recommend a look at this article. Its authors have proposed an interesting scheme by which the mechanisms for accepting elements of a negative subculture within a group operate. Proceeding from the fact that the use of drugs has, as a rule, a group nature and the activities of any informal group should be extremal for at least one parameter either prohibited, superfashionable, extraordinary, going beyond the limits of the generally accepted or dangerous and risky, Yu.B. Leontyev, V.P. Lozbyakov and V.S. Ovchinskiy list the elements from which the high degree of extremism is formed for drug users. This is prohibition, extravagance, pseudofashionableness, the risk involved in purchasing the drug and the negative legal and moral judgment. Here the inaccessibility of narcotics is compensated for by a desire to stand out, by a desire for risk, the "tickling" of nerves and so forth. The authors correctly assume that consideration of these factors which possess a strong attractive action is essential in correct preventive work and in successful antidrug propaganda.

**A.I. Kravchenko:** I have never been specially involved with the problems of drug addiction, but as a citizen and a father, I often ask myself the question: why the urge for destruction, who is to blame here, is there something common to those who take to drugs, that is, in the family, in the social environment and possibly a fatal role is played by the psychophysiological and personality traits? Anzor Aleksandrovich [Gabiani], what would you say on this question?

#### Drug Addiction in Its Sociological Measurement

**A.A. Gabiani:** The composite image of a drug addict, of course, is very arbitrary but I would still like to try to generalize the research data coming from Georgia. At the same time, I will endeavor to show the development trends of drug addiction in the republic and the dynamics. I have such an opportunity as, as I have

already said, 15 years have passed between the two studies. Incidentally, the results of the last one were taken up in my article published in the first issue of SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in 1987. Thus, in the studied contingent of drug users, a majority—over 90 percent—was made up of males although, according to the data of the second poll, there was a certain increase in the share of women. The lethal increase was found chiefly among the youth with the age of  $\frac{1}{3}$  of all the respondents not exceeding 25 years. Here you must consider that, evidently, there were even more of them as it is extremely difficult to locate young drug users. A majority lives in cities, but while during the first poll they were chiefly inhabitants of Tbilisi, then 15 years later drug addiction had also penetrated the medium and small towns and even remote rural areas. In terms of educational level, those questioned differed little from their contemporaries with 83.8 percent having a secondary, incomplete higher and higher education. The previous data show a different picture. At that time, around 15 percent were either completely illiterate or had completed only primary school, while a predominant majority—76.2 percent—had an incomplete secondary education. Now about the family. According to the results of the last study, among the entire group of those questioned, 6.3 percent had no parents at all or spent their childhood in orphanages. And among those who had served a criminal sentence, there were even more of these, 13.4 percent. Basically, they were orphans whose fathers had perished in the war and their mothers had died early. In the second group, that is, in 1984-1985, 3.6 percent of those studies had not grown up in a parental family. Here there were significantly fewer of those who had been orphaned and lived in an orphanage. The reasons that the children had grown up without parents were different and included the moving of the father and mother for job reasons to another city for an extended time, the divorce of the parents and so forth and as a result of this the child for a long period of time was sent to a boarding school or left to be raised by grandmothers, grandfathers and other relatives. The parents of many current respondents are rather educated persons and almost a quarter of them completed VUZes. Some 10-15 years ago, among the parents of those questioned there were significantly more who had obtained only a primary education or were illiterate. The living conditions and material status of those studied in 1984-1985 were completely satisfactory, and for 5.4 percent of them the mother or father held a high official position. Although 45 percent of the respondents judged relations in the family and with the parents as good, and 33.1 percent as satisfactory, a more thorough analysis showed that the situation in this sense was in no way so favorable. In approximately one out of two families, someone abused alcohol or drugs, had a criminal record or was sick often with nervous or mental illnesses.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that certain figures must be interpreted, considering the influence of various factors. For example, the share of those who were in school at the moment of the questioning in

1984-1985 was significantly below the analogous indicator for the research at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s: respectively, 10.5 and 34 percent. Is it possible on the grounds of these data to conclude that at present the student youth to a lesser degree than 10-15 years ago is afflicted with a terrible malaise? Unfortunately, behind the given figures stand not promising changes for the better but rather quite different circumstances. The problem is that when the first study was made, the attitude to those who "got high" on drugs was, if not neutral then completely tolerant, if not to say indifferent. In the years which passed, the responsibility of the VUZes and other institutions of learning in the republic on the question of combating the spread of drug addiction among students had significantly risen. However, for many leaders the sense and purpose of this struggle was simply to "clean house." If you were caught using drugs then you were thrown out of the institute, technical school or school, and then it was somebody else's problem. In this manner, they "thinned" the ranks of the student drug addicts who "smartened up" and left for the "deep underground."

In the course of both studies, the question was asked of where they tried drugs for the first time? In comparing the two studies we were convinced that the proportional amount of persons who replied that they tried drugs for the first time in their lives in places of incarceration had declined by more than 6-fold—from 30.1 to 4.8 percent. In other words, prisons and colonies had ceased to serve as the main nurseries of drug addiction, as had been the case in the second half of the 1960s. At the same time, over the past period the proportional amount of those who had tried drugs for the first time at their home or in the apartment of another drug addict had more than doubled (from 15.3 to 37.2 percent), and there was also an increase in the share who first tried drugs in the walls of an institution of learning (from 3.4 to 4.8 percent). Finally, there was the extremely alarming fact of the doubling (from 0.91 to 1.8 percent) of persons who tried drugs during military service. I do not know whether this information will get past Glavlit, but it seems to me that such things should be known.

The changes which have occurred are difficult to assess uniformly. On the one hand, there have been clear successes in the fight against the spread of drug addiction in prisons and penal colonies while on the other hand there has been a broadening of the centers of the sickness, the existence of "carriers" where this should not be in principle and increased instances when drug addiction goes underground.

**V.V. Guldan:** I am in complete agreement with Gabiani. Being at one time an exotic product of the criminal world and the "golden youth," drug addiction has emerged from a defined social space and has spread into the student youth. One of the tasks confronting the psychologists is to establish the sociopsychological and pathophysiological factors in the risk of the penetration of drug addiction. According to the data of the well-known

psychiatrist A.Ye. Lichko, in the development of juvenile drug and toxic substance abuse, the main role is played by group activities. Up to 90 percent of the juveniles first tried drugs and opiates in the company of contemporaries in endeavoring "to keep up." Another important motive is considered to be the search for unusual sensations and experiences. In interviewing a large group of toxic substance abusers from 9 to 21 years of age, Ts.P. Korolenko and V.Yu. Zavyalov discovered that the main psychic effects which the persons surveyed were trying for were so-called altered states of awareness.

It is interesting how the juveniles themselves explain the reasons for use. As is known, the reasons are far from always reflecting the real motivation and sometimes even conceal it. V.S. Bitenskiy, A.Ye. Lichko and B.G. Khersonskiy who studied 374 juveniles from 12 to 17 years of age in 1988 established that the most frequently encountered motive was "the desire to keep up with your peers" with 31 percent. Then came "the intention to experience an emotionally uplifted state" (high) with 19 percent, "the search for new sensations" ("try sniffers") with 12 percent and "the desire to forget oneself" with 10 percent. Then followed "curiosity" with 8 percent, "the influence of an elder" with 7 percent, "the desire to demonstrate one's unusualness to contemporaries" with 6 percent, "the stimulation of creativity" with 3 percent, "the substitution for unavailable alcohol" with 2 percent, "demonstration protest to elders" with 1 percent. These data were compared with the objective factors contributing to drug addiction and which were established in 71 percent of the investigated juveniles. Also noted were: lack of success in studies (27 percent), chronic alcoholism of the father (22 percent), harsh dealing with the juvenile in the family (19 percent), the impossibility of satisfying the desire for a future vocation (18 percent), constant conflicts between parents (17 percent), emotional rejection by the mother (17 percent), the divorce of the parents which altered for the worse the social and psychological status of the juvenile (14 percent), alcoholism of the mother (13 percent), protest of family interference (12 percent), placement in a special boarding school (9 percent), rejection by peers due to presence of physical disability in juvenile (9 percent), the forced parting with a close friend (8 percent), tragic events in the family (4 percent), the experiencing of sexual inadequacy (3 percent), and the presence of drug addiction in the family (1 percent).

These extremely interesting data for the first time have exposed to us the picture of the sociopsychological factors which contribute to drug addiction. The authors checked out the often-found notion of boredom and enforced idleness as an important reason for the spread of drug addiction and substance abuse among juveniles and discovered that among the objective reasons "boredom" was one of the rarest conditions contributing to drug addiction of juveniles (1 percent).

One of the most important questions for preventing drug addiction is establishing the differences between the

random "experimenters" with drugs and toxic substances for whom this trial within the juvenile subculture remains an isolated episode and those who are inclined to regular use. In contrast to the first group the composition of which is diverse and random, in the second, in a psychological study, one discovers a very typical range of predisposing factors and circumstances: troubles, conflict relations in the family, a "broken home," insufficient emotional life in relations between parents and children, parental alcoholism. For the juveniles in the second group, characteristic are low self-esteem, the presence of mental anomalies and they evidence indications of suppressed depressive states, the absence or reduced level of motivation for achievement, differentiated interests and poor success in studies.

The indications which can point to possible drug addiction in a juvenile and which should be known by the parents and pedagogues are the following: disruptions in forming a circle of friends or in the choice of friends; a tendency to "retreat into mysteriousness"; disturbances of ordinary biological rhythm; the appearance of slang and particular interests in music and literature; unmotivated changes in mood and depressive disturbances; a particular content to telephone conversations; unmotivated requests for money and for which no accounting is given; instability in relations with others; frequent change of friends. Of course, not everything listed here applies to juveniles using drugs and a portion of these symptoms can be symptoms of puberty, however the aggregate of them provides a rather accurate picture.

In order to reach the groups at risk, we are working out a program of sociopsychological research directly in the schools, the PTU and in the informal youth groups. The latter are of special interest, since in some of them the use of drugs is a component of the subculture.

**A.M. Presman:** At present, among the informal groups—and I have in mind the constructive groups—drug consumption has noticeably declined. Conditions have appeared for self-rehabilitation.

#### Religion, Money, the Law...

**K.A. Shchadilova:** An interesting approach to studying the spread of drug addiction has been proposed by American researchers E. Emoeting and S. Barr. In pointing out that juveniles often have drug addict friends from whom they adopt an affirmative attitude toward the use of drugs, the scientists feel that it is essential to clarify first of all who still does not fall under such an influence. In other words, it is important not so much to answer the question of why the juveniles are "infected" by a bad example as it is to determine the reason why a portion of them condemns a drug habit. It has turned out that religiousness acts as a strong countering factor.

**A.M. Presman:** I know many children who have been able to "get off the needle." Here approximately 70 percent of them were helped by religion.

**Comment from the floor:** Remember, religion is the opiate of the people!

**A.M. Presman:** I remember another part of the quote by K. Marx: "The heart of the heartless world, the spirit of the soulless orders...."

**B.F. Kalachev:** I would agree that the church can and even must be involved in the fight against drug addiction. However, if one examines the question from the historical viewpoint, it can be seen that the role of religion in the drug problem is far from uniform. Here everything is not so simple. Let me explain what I mean. At the beginning of the century, Russian scientists drew attention to the direct link between the spread of drug addiction and practicing Islam. This link, unfortunately, also exists now. One of the reasons why Central Asia as before is a source of the spread of drugs is, in my view, that the way of life imposed by Islam on the local population with the connivance and support of the "Adyls" and "Rashidovs" inevitably requires colossal amounts of money for celebrating the so-called national but essentially cult rites. There is no other way to earn such amounts except dishonestly. Judge for yourselves. According to data of research conducted by the Ethnography Chair at MGU [Moscow State University], in Andizhan Oblast, where there are around 160,000 families each of which consists as an average of 10 persons, annually spends 266 million rubles on dowries. In Turkmenia, bride money varies from 20,000 to 40,000 rubles (incidentally, in certain areas it is traditional—for entertaining guests—in a wedding to put out 0.5-1 kg of opium the cost of which on the "black" market is 50,000-100,000 rubles). Funerals cost from 3,000 to 5,000 rubles and a circumcision about the same. This is the case regardless of the fact that, according to the estimates of scientists, the expenditures on the mentioned rites exceed the total wage fund by 50 percent (for example, in the areas of the Fergana Valley), that an average of a little more than 30 kopecks a day remains for living, while there are one or two vehicles in the courtyard and rich furnishings are no exception. How can such a paradox be explained? Due to research over many years, ethnographers have been able to establish that much income is obtained by the population from the intensive use of subsidiary farms and in particular the use of nitrates and herbicides for greater vegetable and fruit crops. This is one source. The other is related to the fact that in endeavoring to live as "people," that is, within the traditions and customs prescribed by the shariat and adat (customary law[,]) many people set out to obtain maximum income with minimum expenditures. This is bribery, theft and other criminal actions including speculation, smuggling and selling of drugs.

Now about the currently fashionable nontraditional religions involving drugs. At present, there are few who know that V.I. Lenin gave serious attention to this question. In studying philosophical literature in the Sorbonne Library, he studied, for example, a number of works by the American psychiatrist W. James. The latter had proposed a new interpretation of the concept of God

as a cosmic substance which could be reached not only through prayer but also by hallucinogenics or intense special exercises based upon Eastern methods (meditation). Here the scientist, relying on his own personal experience in the use of drugs, urged his unsuspecting readers to use drugs, including in a meditative "intellectual" form.

Among modern youth—and our research has confirmed this—there is a good number who are familiar with the original or xerox publications of foreign officers who have preached a drug culture, in particular, C. Castaneda, J.C. Lilly and certain others. These authors, like James, have reached the idea of an Universal God who can be "reached" through drugs.

At the same time, Soviet specialists who have studied the nontraditional religions have constantly considered these among the attributes of the Western way of life. For example, in the book "Vozrozhdeniye mistitsizm?" [Has Mysticism Been Reborn?], P.S. Gurevich, in adhering to the strictly "Western" hypothesis of the existence of a "drug revolution," has examined the mystical experience of Lilly's penetration into the "twilight conscience," but does not mention that the American scientist achieved this with the aid of LSD-25 and other psychodelics. The same thing can be said about Ye.G. Balagushkin and K.B. Privalov.... This is all the result of our immobile ideological work and extended underestimation of socio-logical research.

**A.M. Presman:** You have made a major error in reversing the statistics. Here there is the reverse determination, that is, consumption causes in some, rather well-developed persons, an interest in philosophical and mystical concepts.

**B.F. Kalachev:** This is not the essence of the problem. The main thing is that there are people who intentionally, for the sake of their own gain throw a "bone" to the uninitiated reader. I am profoundly convinced that specialists should be concerned with studying the unknown in man and not green youths. Moreover, in order to have psychodelics for particular experiments, it is essential to either set up an underground laboratory for their production or obtain them by smuggling. Either instance is criminal and is criminally punishable. Finally, there is the other aspect. Practice indicates that those who are engaged in the distribution of drugs usually make money off of this. Consequently, any form of the illegal production and sale of drugs is immoral, whatever arguments of justification the researchers themselves might provide for justification.

**A.I. Kravchenko:** This is a very interesting turn of events for us, although somewhat unexpected. Possibly, we can now return to those "subjects" which Presman set out in his introductory comments? I would like to propose discussing the legal aspect of the problem: what are the difficulties here, are there innovations in the legislation and what must be changed?

**A.A. Gabiani:** Allow me in the context of the questions posed to come back to the results of the research conducted in Georgia. Let me recall that we established two groups: those who used drugs at liberty and those questioned in places of incarceration. As it happened, over the period which passed between the two studies, virtually all differences which had previously been observed in the representatives of these two groups were obliterated. The basic contingent of persons studied in places of incarceration at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s consisted predominantly of older drug addicts who belonged to the criminal world. Many of them were orphans who had been raised by strangers or in orphanages. A majority of them showed a clearly marked physical, social and moral degradation.

Judging from the results of the repeat study, at present both categories have drawn closer together. What is the reason for this? In my view, this merging has occurred chiefly as a consequence of the imperfection of the current criminal legislation and court practices. For what crimes were the drug addicts and users condemned and who were interrogated at places of incarceration in the course of the second study, that is, in the mid-1980s? The basic number—66 percent—had been condemned for the illegal manufacture, purchase, storing, transporting, sending or sale of drugs and other strong-acting and toxic substances. Among those questioned in the second half of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s, only a few had committed crimes directly related to the manufacture, purchase or sale of drugs. Furthermore, from among the respondents of the second study a majority of 72.4 percent had been punished for the illegal manufacture, purchase, storage, transporting or sending of narcotic substances without the intention to sell and only 27 percent for the illegal manufacture, purchase, storage, transporting or sending in the aim of selling or for the selling of drugs. Thus, drug dealers among those condemned were approximately 2 1/2-fold less than those who had manufactured, purchased or kept them not for further sale but basically for their own needs.

The given data clearly show that in the prisoner's docket and then in places of incarceration there are a majority of instances of not sellers of drugs but rather users. Most often these are young people apprehended at the moment of purchasing the drugs or who were in possession of small amounts of drugs which they did not intend to sell.

The problem is not only that society does not gain in forcing into a penal colony the person who should be treated. The young fellows who have tentatively entered a dangerous path in the criminal environment often merely gain experience. And although at present energetic measures are being taken to thwart the availability of drugs in places of incarceration, the channels are not still completely closed.

**A.M. Presman:** In the first issue of SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in 1987, the article "Drug

"Use and Addiction" provides a forecast for the event of an incorrect approach to the problem. To fight using methods of force is like piling firewood on a bonfire. In the bulletin ORIYENTIRY (No 5, 1988), the lawyer Leontyev writes directly that such methods lead to an improvement in techniques and a strengthening of conspiracy.

The number of dealers has risen now and while previously you had to sell a rucksack full for a profit, now a small package is enough. The individual drug addict who picks 10 poppy heads and prepares a dose for himself has greater responsibility than the person who purchases the ready-made and thereby materially supports the mechanism for the distribution of drugs.

**O.V. Osipenko:** Common sense in the measures applied in the combating of drug addiction is often absent. Administrative responsibility is, as they say, a dead issue. For the drug addict any effect has long been lost. Or take a fine of 50 rubles. A drug addict can spend such an amount in a day.

I am an economist and I adhere to a skeptical viewpoint on all such measures. Something similar to what was the case with alcoholism is now happening with drug addiction. Research indicates that the business related to drug addiction is now one of the sectors of our economy. Here a simple economic law operates which indicates the absurdity of prohibitive measures. We set 5 years of responsibility for the use of drugs. The prices double. We increase the period up to 10 years, the prices rise by 4-fold and, finally, we introduce execution—and, of course, I am joking—and drugs will cost millions.

**V.V. Kapustin:** There are countries where the possession of even 1 gm of a drug means the death penalty, however, prices have not increased there....

**O.V. Osipenko:** But the scale of addiction does not decline. A society which employs such measures is unviable. This is nothing more than the inability to use other levers.

**V.V. Kapustin:** The prices are not increased due to stronger measures of punishment. The entire question is to make the struggle against drugs stronger.

Comrades here have been discussing the law but they are not aware of the essence of the question. Our state has set out to humanize legislation. For example, a decision has been adopted to repeal the death penalty for 38 types of crime and punishments have been reduced including for those related to drugs. While before there was criminal liability for the use of drugs, this is not now the case. I view legislation as a restraining factor. The previous speaker said that supposedly it costs nothing for a drug addict to spend 50 rubles a day. Possibly this is the case. But the thing we must consider is that at the present there are 130,000 registered drug users, including 50,000 addicts and 80,000 who have used drugs at least once. Among them are many children and for their parents a fine of 50 rubles is a very tangible measure.

The new legislation lifts liability from the person who has prepared a small quantity of a drug for himself and not for the purpose of sale. For the possession of small amounts a person is not even held liable in administrative practices. In a word, it is essential to know the legislation.

**O.V. Osipenko:** I do not claim a knowledge of the laws but I am speaking about logic and about the unjustified hopes which are placed on prohibition, on the mania for banning things. Before fighting the real drug addicts who have departed for the world of illusions, we must free ourselves of our own illusions that this problem can be solved by prohibition.

I was the co-executor of an economics study the results of which show that activities involving drugs are one of the most highly profitable. With such a situation, no prohibitive measures will work.

Drug addiction amongst the youth involves not only the young persons who show off and steal. There are also the dealers. For them 100 rubles is pocket money. These are the pushers in the schools and PTU. They are still not the bosses and not the organizers but are already real mafiosi.

In order for the young people to satisfy their needs now, they must have a good deal of money. Fashionable clothing, records, tickets for rock concerts—the prices for all these things are constantly rising and where can the money be found? For many a solution to the problem is seen in an introduction to drug business as until recently healthy young fellows did not have the right to work. In the current year at a session of the Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems], the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee fellows who had reached the age of 14 were allowed to work at an enterprise. But let us be realistic: would they be able to earn a great deal in 2 or 3 hours at a state enterprise?

**A.Ya. Vilks:** Enterprises are not interested in juveniles as they cause a lot of problems and there is virtually no gain.

**O.V. Osipenko:** At present, a good deal of cooperatives has appeared. You can begin working in them from the age of 16 and obtain a patent at the age of 18. Here, of course, there are other opportunities....

**A.M. Presman:** I would like to raise a question which until recently was better left unsaid. It is a question that a portion of the confiscated drugs disappears without a trace. I would not go so far as to assert that all this amount remains, to put it mildly, with the dishonest police workers but I do know precisely that cases when money is exchanged for the destruction of a record (previously 25 rubles, now 100) are no rarity. As it was frankly put by one such zealot of order, "why kill the lamb when it can still be fleeced." There is a double gain of drugs and money, on the one hand, and the absence of registered drug addicts, on the other. This is virtually an unassailable area as the person paying the bribe will not

complain. In the police departments of major cities a purge is underway but the given phenomenon has not been completely eliminated. As long as there is an opportunity to get money from this, those who are fond of easy gain will not disappear. In my view, we must introduce a clause which provides stricter punishment for those who already have a record and who turn up with a group of persons not previously with a record. Furthermore, we must more clearly define the age limits of the drug users: 12-14-16-18 years of age. This will help prevent the "exchange of experience," to separate the groups both by age and by "experience" and, consequently, to take a more differentiated approach to the work.

**A.G. Danilin:** We learned 5 years ago that juveniles 12-14 years of age were engaged in distributing drugs with the aim of earning money. Unfortunately, a majority of the measures undertaken in our country are approximately the same time late. In order to win in the fight against drug addiction, there must be legal guarantees and they should extend to all services whose activities involve this problem. Certainly the drug addicts should not be allowed to live at the expense of others.

**A.M. Presman:** But certainly when a person goes to a physician in the hope of obtaining help and beginning treatment, and the physician calls the police—and such instances have occurred—one can scarcely speak about the beneficial intervention of the law enforcement bodies. One other matter for reflection. Inveterate drug users, as a rule, are people without a future. They themselves are well aware of this and feel that there is only one solution for them and that is complete isolation with life-long access to drugs.

**O.V. Osipenko:** What is your view of the Western experience of establishing communes?

**A.G. Danilin:** There they have rigid financial and economic structures and a rigid legal status. Under our conditions, the setting up of such organizations is unrealistic.

**A.M. Presman:** Such communes do exist in abandoned villages near Rzhev and Volokolamsk. We must simply realize that drug addiction there is as natural as cancer. We must consider this as a fact.

**B.F. Kalachev:** I decisively do not agree with the last assertion. Man is a rational being. As is known in the animal world, narcotics play the role of a special tool of natural selection. To recognize the "naturalness" of drug addiction in a socially organized society means to shift the mechanism of natural selection from the realm of nature into civilization as prevailing over the conscience of people and this is absurd. Incidentally, the increase in oncological patients also has its socioeconomic causes. As for the communes, here it must be remembered that people work here and any labor brings income. Foreign practice shows that there have been frequent instances

when the leadership of such communes has enriched itself in mercilessly exploiting the rank-and-file members.

**A.G. Danilin:** You will always find people who endeavor to escape the law. As soon as they appear in a commune, the commune collapses. Here it is essential to have a leader who has legal, economic and insurance guarantees. Generally speaking, I am not against such communes and I favor anonymous hospitals, inpatient and outpatient treatment. There must be services which operate under cost accounting conditions. On the one hand, there should be a legal guarantee and, on the other, simply an economic gain.

**A.A. Gabiani:** Both the parents of drug addicts and they themselves fear publicity not only because they are afraid of embarrassing the family. Although a drug addict who uses drugs himself and does not involve others in this is considered not a criminal but rather a sick person, even voluntary turning to medical aid ends with compulsory special registration. Precisely this, in the words of those questioned and their parents with whom we were able to speak is the main stumbling block. People resort to the services of private physicians and try to place their children in hospitals in other cities of the nation. In order to make certain that each drug user sooner or later does not wind up on a criminal path (and the later treatment starts the fewer the chances of its favorable outcome and the higher the probability of criminal actions by the drug addicts) it is essential to provide conditions where the patient will feel complete trust in the physician and the hospitals will begin receiving patients not only escorted by representatives of the law enforcement bodies.

As of now we do not have anonymous treatment of drug addiction. The basic approach which is presently obligatory is to provide treatment only after special registration.

**A.M. Presman:** Because of our propaganda which depicts drug addiction as something almost mystically terrible, in a majority of instances drug addicts are considered with fear and hate. But certainly these are sick persons who must be helped and they must not be pushed into the network of organized drug crime.

**A.Ya. Vilks:** Recently, many public funds have appeared in the nation and the State Bank has opened up various accounts. Why not set up an analogous fund and open a special account for combating drug addiction?

**A.M. Presman:** The Sobriety Society has a good physical plant but is not concerned with anything except collecting dues. Incidentally, sobriety is abstention not only from alcohol. If the society has compromised itself it must be reorganized. We must utilize what is including quarters, finances and also call in specialists.

**A.G. Danilin:** All powers relating to drug addiction have been turned over to the Drug Studies Center....

**V.V. Guldān:** When the question arises of specific aid, particularly for funds which are needed and the physical plant, one must know first of all the scale of the phenomenon. I am very concerned by the figures which were given by the Minzdrav of 140,000 persons on preventive registration. Last year, I conducted a survey in Latvia. According to my observations, for every single registered drug addict there are 10 unregistered ones.

**A.A. Gabiani:** We also have similar data: for each detected user of drugs there are 10-12 undetected ones. So the final figure for the nation could reach 1.3-1.5 million persons.

**B.F. Kalachev:** My figures lead one to even gloomier reflections. Out of the school children and students of the PTU from 14 to 17 years of age and the students of institutions of learning who were polled by us, 26.3 percent had tried drugs and toxic substances at least once and 2.9 percent used them constantly. According to statistics, the nation has around 19.7 million young men and women in this age category. If one extrapolates the data obtained by us (and I would like to point out that the surveyed regions of Moscow, Kiev and Krasnodar Kray are in no way particularly "infected" by drug addiction, and there are areas which are more dangerous in this regard) to the entire Soviet Union, then it turns out that approximately 0.5 million of the student youth could be diagnosed for drug addiction (or toxic substance abuse) and around 5 million persons would get high occasionally. And we must also consider the figures: each person questioned mentioned an average of two acquaintances who used drugs and in the "high risk" group there were five.

**A.A. Gabiani:** Comrades have spoken here about involving the Sobriety Society in the fight against drug addiction. In my view, it would be advisable to set up a Commission to Combat Drunkenness, Alcoholism and Drug Addiction under the USSR Council of Ministers as well as analogous commissions in all the Union and autonomous republics, krais, oblasts, cities, large industrial enterprises, schools and so forth. Actually, similar commissions have existed since the mid-1970s and for this reason the task now is to carry out their appropriate reorganization and give them new functions. For this reason also under all similar organizations at least on the level of the USSR, the Union and autonomous republics, krais and oblasts, we must set up permanent regular subdivisions. They could be called, for example, working groups or committees and be in charge of day-to-day supervision and collecting complete, reliable and objective information for taking various decisions.

In addition, a special scientific research institute or center with regional departments could play a major role in carrying out profound sociological, criminological,

sociopsychological and legal research on the problems of drug addiction. Of course, such a center should be provided with a proper physical plant, money and highly skilled personnel. I agree with Presman that the necessary money could be partially collected from the All-Union and regional sobriety societies which thereby would broaden their activities and make them more effective.

Furthermore, for organizing unified accounting as well as for up-to-date analysis of the situation and for compiling scientifically sound realistic effective and long-range integrated plans for combating drug addiction, drunkenness and alcoholism on the scale of the entire nation as well as its individual regions, it would be advisable to work out and introduce an Automated Information System. With the present level of scientific development, this is a completely realistic matter at present. With the aid of such a system it would be possible to provide automatic registration of drug addicts, alcoholics and drunks; provide a description of the state and dynamics of development for drug addiction, alcoholism and drunkenness; assess the statistical characteristics of the main factors contributing to the growth of these negative phenomena; forecast their development; work out appropriate recommendations for the party, soviet, law enforcement and other bodies.

Of course, significant capital investments would be required for the quarters, computer equipment, the necessary personnel of highly skilled co-workers and so forth, but all these expenditures would be paid back many times over if we consider the enormous socioeconomic harm which our society and state presently suffer from drug addiction, alcoholism and drunkenness. The main thing is to overcome the stereotype which has come into being over the decades and is still with us. I have in mind the illusion that acute social problems can be analyzed and successfully resolved without any expenditures whatsoever.

No one would ever take it into their head to confront scientists and engineers with the task of solving new technical problems, for example, in the area of electronics or the peaceful development of space without the appropriate financing, the material-technical and personnel support. But for combating such a social evil as drug addiction, it would seem that nothing of the sort is required.

**A.I. Kravchenko:** Thank you, Anzor Aleksandrovich [Gabiani]. It seems to me that you have made very useful proposals. Even from our discussion it can be seen that a great deal still remains to be done to get things off dead center.

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### Adult Education Centers

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[Text] Adult education centers (AEC) are a specific experiment and a model for a new socioeducational institution and achieved by the joint efforts of practical and scientific workers over almost 10 years of their collaboration. The newness of the experiment is that it was not purely pedagogical, when the individual "blocks" of the existing system were worked out without going beyond the existing socioeducational institution. The education centers arose in the course of a radical altering of the very educational institution and its ties with society. This is an unique example of an institution of learning which was "fitted" into the socioeconomic and sociocultural profile of a region, a social phenomenon which broke with our customary notions of the possibility of combining general educational, vocational and general cultural knowledge.

The centers arose in the mid-1970s. They are largely similar to the Western Open Universities and "people's academies" which are frequently mentioned among the fractions of cultural life in Finland or England. And what has been happening in our country, in Minsk, Nikolayev, Zaporozhye, Riga, Kherson, on the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], in Uzbekistan, the Far North and in the small towns of Vetka, Regitsa, Novaya Odessa, where the adult education centers have existed now for a decade? Some of them have withstood the years-long testing for stability while others have not. The experience of their functioning serves as a sort of example of the fight for innovation in public education while the "model AEC" is a model of perestroyka both in the adult education sphere as well as the educational situation as a whole.

The adult education center is a new type of institution of learning which integrates different functions. Its numerous subdivisions provide a secondary education, they give vocational training and retraining, advanced training, they provide preparation for VUZes and technical schools, they provide consultation for correspondence students, they organize the work of diverse elective groups according to different interests, they provide pedagogical universal instruction for the public and so forth. Here study people who are receiving or already

have received a secondary education and are continuing instruction on various courses and in the vocational training system.

The basic principle in the work of the center is its orientation to regional requirements, on the one hand, and the needs of the public, on the other. The flexible, mobile structure of the training subdivisions makes it possible, depending upon demand, to also change supply, to establish new educational courses or eliminate obsolete ones and effectively incorporate corrections in their content. Along with teachers the exercises are conducted by specialists from the vocational training system and "educators": members of the Znaniye [Knowledge] Society, positions, as well as cultural and educational workers. Financing is provided by the public education bodies and organizations interested in the vocational training and retraining of their workers as well as by the students themselves (paying-the-way courses). The centers have made substantial adjustments in the local socioeducational situation which, as is known, provides a far from equal opportunity for "everyone to study anything." The centers, to a greater degree than the other educational institutions, fit into the economic and sociocultural profile of a region and way of life of the population.

The general principles for operating the centers in practice are implemented in different variations. For example, one of them is a center oriented at combining general educational and vocational training for young people who after 8th grade are being placed in production. The initiator of such instruction was G.F. Cherednichenko who organized a center in Nikolayev on the basis of the evening school No. 5. The juveniles considered themselves too adult for a school, they did not want to enter a PTU [vocational-technical school] since the 3-year period of instruction was unjustifiably long for them. "Production classrooms" were established for them. Three days a week the young people obtain general educational and theoretical vocational knowledge (according to a curriculum approved by the sectorial ministries), and 3 days a week work on the job. The choice of specialties is very great as here they train lathe operators, milling machine operators, grinders, radio technicians, computer operators, dispatcher-planners, bookkeepers, junior medical nurses and nursery teachers. Depending upon the specific specialty, training lasts from 6 months to 3 years. Here it is possible also to obtain an allied specialty, improve skills and participate in the work of various courses and circles (electives) according to interest.

It can be said that presently this is the most popular model, because it is designed for juveniles who for various reasons have selected a job but want to complete general education school. The satisfying of the need for early vocational self-determination and real independence is a dependable educational base all the more as many juveniles studying at the Nikolayev Center are

among the difficult-learners and need social rehabilitation. After Nikolayev, similar centers were set up in Zaporozhe, Kherson, Tashkent and other cities.

There are also different versions. For example, centers with developed forms of so-called postschool education and on the basis of which such a center provides vocational training, prepares for admission to VUZes and technical schools, it organizes the work of electives and courses, it actively employs club forms of work and offers knowledge not provided by the secondary school curriculum. Precisely such a variation was selected by the Vetka and Rechitsa Centers. The center in Vetka (the initiator for establishing this first center in the nation was A.A. Bondarenko) under the conditions of a rayon agroindustrial complex assumed all the work in the area of the general educational and cultural-educational training of the students. The center works in close contact with the CPSU raykom and with the assistance and economic support of the rayon's enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. A particular feature of this version is that all the students in the "service" area go to the center. This is convenient, if the center is comparatively small. In other instances more suitable is the model operating in Novaya Odessa in Nikolayev Oblast (center leader, A.G. Rudenko), where the education centers function in seven large kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The kolkhoz chairman and the sovkhоз directors have agreed to head the production-pedagogical councils of the centers as they are very interested in their work with the centers resolving many questions in raising the general educational, vocational and general cultural level of the public. The party and soviet rayon administrative bodies have approved a "Regulation" on the training centers and sample expenditures for their running. The establishing of the centers was provided in the plans for the economic and social development of the farms. Their work is taken into account in summing up the results of the socialist competition.

Virtually all centers incorporate regional adjustments. Postschool education is organized independently for graduates by the Riga Center which operates on the basis of evening school No. 14 (initiator of the experiment, Kh.M. Bregman). The diverse cultural and educational work includes teaching psychology and pedagogics, the organization of family recreation, and familiarization with the artistic values of world culture. Such educational methods, the organizer feels, meet the cultural and national traditions of Latvia.

Each new education center is essentially the manifestation of social initiative and an act of creativity. Thus, in the settlement of Kicher in Sevrobaykalskiy Rayon of the Buryat ASSR, the center works with correspondence students, it provides vocational knowledge and helps graduates gain admission to higher institutions of learning (leader, A.N. Sidorkina). Precisely on the basis of this center which was established in a developing settlement on the route of the BAM the idea was crystallized of combining all forms of preschool, school and postschool education. The pedagogical collective can determine a uniform educational policy in the small population point and actively influence the way of life of the adults and the children, involving the students and members of their family in various educational circles, in conservation work, in the youth theater, sports sections, artistic studios and so forth. The organization of such centers in areas remote from large industrial cities is economically advantageous as the number of regular pedagogues is reduced, the expenditures of the sponsoring organizations are concentrated and the vocational training for the personnel is carried out considering the real requirements of the region.

In a rural locality, such an association can occur under the aegis of a school, in new settlements where young predominate on the basis of the adult education centers and in large cities under the initiative associations which meet the diverse interests of the people.

In the developing system of ongoing education, the centers can play a special role. In the first place, here general and special (vocational) education is brought together as designed for the needs of the region for specific specialties. Secondly, under the conditions of the transition of the national economy to the principles of self-payment and cost accounting, precisely the dynamic centers can quickly set up vocational retraining for the personnel. Thirdly, in small population points the centers, as base educational facilities, are capable of organizing economic and pedagogic universal education and diverse courses of special interests.

But probably the most essential thing is the method of organizing the centers and the method of their work best suit the population. In comparison with other educational institutions, the centers are more actively linked to both young people and adults. Thus, usually the Novaya Odessa correspondence school trained around 800-900 persons. Under the new conditions, it is actually involved with another 1,000 persons annually. And if one considers that many educational measures of the center are attended by "auditors," then the zone of influence becomes even broader.

**Motivation for Education Depending Upon Type of Center, %**

Motivation for Education	First Center (22 workshops)	Second Center (8 workshops)	Third Center (1 workshop)	General Education Evening School
Possibility of vocational self-determination	87.5	43.7	50.0	37.5
Preparation for possible changes in life	34.4	29.9	37.5	25.0
Educational certificate	28.0	19.5	39.6	75.0
Moral satisfaction	62.5	14.9	56.3	37.5
Interesting recreation	21.9	26.4	56.3	50.0
Obtaining of practical skills	71.9	34.5	25.0	43.8

The more actively a center meets the needs of the public the greater the interest in instruction in it. Take a look at the table which records the direct dependence of motivation for study upon the number of educational workshops which in principle a working person can select. The centers shown in the table differ in varying orientation. In the first, there is a clear focus on diverse types and forms of adult education (22 workshops) but with preference for professional ones (15). In the second, one can trace a consistent general cultural orientation. Preference is given to individual educational measures and elective courses (8) which develop the overall culture of adults. The third center is focused on postschool education and deepening the general educational humanitarian training for adults (1 workshop). Finally, there is the ordinary, well-operated school.

In comparing the reasons for instruction in an ordinary evening school and in the centers one can trace a direct dependence between what the center or the school offers and the awareness by the adults of an objective need to learn.

Thus, the centers in the best possible way conform to the new educational policy the need for which was mentioned at the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Here it was the issue of not merely obliging centers to be opened up everywhere nor was it to make them the only form of education. The centers were to be established upon initiative from below as a response to the new needs of the regions. This is a democratic form of education. Unfortunately, an impediment to this innovative process has been the contradiction between departmental interests, the customary methods of realizing them and the general social tasks of the system of ongoing education. The sharpness of this contradiction has been intensified with the development of the new forms of instruction as its innovators go beyond the well-trod departmental track, disrupting the established rules of the game. In these situations the centers have lost the support of their immediate leadership and in many instances have developed in overcoming direct resistance from it. Some have survived if they found support from the party and soviet organizations while others merely ceased existing.

The centers, although not contradicting the traditional goals for an evening school (everyone remembers the slogan "a secondary education for each young worker"), have still understood their tasks much more broadly, that is, to create conditions for ongoing education. They have been ready to carry out this task precisely because they have gone beyond the confines of their organization (the system of evening and correspondence schools), in carrying out a broad circle of socioeducational and socioindoctrinal functions.

However, the system as a whole has not been prepared for this. In 1984-1986, the audit of the evening schools by the financial bodies and by employees of the procurator's office and public education disclosed their low authority in the eyes of the public and in a number of places detected padding of the number of students, the overstating of grades and major financial violations. However, the measures adopted as a result helped merely in slightly smoothing over the conflict but did not fundamentally alter the situation. The promising development model which is the adult education center was not adopted by the former USSR Ministry of Education.

When it is an issue of a social innovation, the most indicative thing is not even the path covered by the pioneers but rather the experience of successors. How the innovation is understood and incorporated, what are the methods of the so-called introduction are far from immaterial for a new undertaking where an essential trait is the presence of an alternative. The successors of the new experiment in adult education immediately felt a dual pressure: public opinion about the evening school as a social myth from the age of stagnation and the public education administrative bodies which endeavored to declare the centers themselves a legend or fabrication.

Let us reemphasize again that the education centers substantially alter the goal orientation of the school. Neither psychologically, morally nor professionally has the pedagogical community been prepared as yet for involvement in radical changes. Everyone realizes that at present, at the end of the 1980s, in an atmosphere of universal search, a fundamental opportunity has appeared to alter something in the educational system.

This favorable social background undoubtedly encourages and supports the creative initiative of the organizers. The decision to establish a center is taken by the school administration. If here the pedagogical collective is indifferent, then the innovation is doomed to gradual extinction. Precisely in the stage of establishment, when it is a question of the development of new forms of adult education, it is difficult to overestimate the creative role of the pedagogical collective since the specific work methods are set out.

The centers mirror the time of changes and this determines in what atmosphere, at what pace and how effectively the process of restructuring education is carried out. It would be a great shame if the innovation which made headway in the poorer times of stagnation did not develop during a period of restructuring of the entire educational institution.

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### Independent Youth Associations

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[Article by I.Yu. Sundiyev: "Independent Youth Associations"; Igor Yuryevich Sundiyev is a candidate of philosophical sciences and docent at the Moscow Higher Police School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Our journal has published his articles "Informal Youth Associations: Experience of Exposition" (No 5, 1987) and "The Professional Under Extreme Conditions" (No 4, 1988)]

[Text] How clear on the sociological level is the problem of the youth movements and the informal associations? Over the last 2 years, a large amount of facts has been accumulated and interesting psychological interpretations have appeared and...that is all. The setbacks of sociological analysis are to be explained, in our view, by the presence of two incorrect premises. The first is to consider the youth movements as a completely new phenomenon for our nation and having their roots exclusively in foreign culture and brought into our land by unknown forces. The second is to view the "informal groups" as "parasites the growth of which is caused by shortcomings in Komsomol work and by the improper exploitation of existing economic and social problems." Both the first and second premises virtually exclude a positive analysis, leaving much space for criticism.

Is there something common in such diverse phenomena as the hippie system and the Pamyat [Memory] Association, the rock-and-rollers and the Miloserdiye [Mercy Movement], the "Greens" and the cooperative members? The common feature here is that they all represent different forms of social (cultural, economic and political) independent activity.

Independent activity, that is, activities based on the inner motives of an individual or group, are an essential attribute in the existence of both man and society. The vector of the social trend in independent activity can vary: from an unconditional coinciding with the direction of society's development to the diametrically opposed. In analyzing the various forms of independent activity, researchers have paid basic attention to the motivational aspect (what do they want?) and the composition of the members (who are they?). However, independent activities, like any activities, are played out in social time and in social space. Social time is a very popular category in modern philosophical, sociological and historical research. Having generalized numerous definitions, it can be said that social time is the pace of life of a social organism. In contrast to physical time, social time is multivariant: in different groups, the pace of life varies and in an integrated form it forms the overall (normative) pace of life of a given society. But this normative pace is not stable but rather is altered depending upon the specific social conditions.<sup>1</sup> In its subjective perception, social time is the pace of events and actions which are significant for an individual or group (thus, social time also includes psychological time as a component element). Social time for a specific group may outstrip the normative or lag behind it (the common for the society), forming various "time zones." This is determined objectively by age (the pace of life of a child or young person is clearly higher than a mature person); by the conditions of activity (extreme conditions require a higher and even super-high pace of activity than do normal ones); by the moral ideas dominating in the various groups and by social orientation.

However, the uniqueness of social time is not exhausted by its pace. While in physical time the vector is the same for all existing matter, in the social the vector of each group may coincide with the normative but it can also differ from it. Moreover, frequently the vector of a specific group deviates not only to the right or to the left but also is directed backward. As analysis indicates, the greatest diversity in the pace and direction (vectors) of development is to be observed during revolutionary periods in the life of a society. A political organization or ruling political party is the expresser of the general (normative) vector.

Social space is also multiple just as there are multiple types of socially significant activity and forms of their regulation. Of an analysis of the examined questions the most important are the three social spaces: intrapersonal development, or independent activity in the initial sense of this word; relaxation in which auxiliary types of activity are realized; socially significant (production, scientific, managerial and so forth) activity.

In each of these there are zones with varying intensity of normative regulation or areas in which activity (for example, economic entrepreneurship) is viewed as socially positive and an area where the same activity is viewed as antisocial (criminal). Figuratively speaking, norms in social spaces do not so much indicate the

directions as they do perform the role of walls which form a corridor along which movement is possible. The more rigid the normative regulation the stronger the walls, the narrower the corridor and the fewer opportunities to choose one's own direction.

In the different historical stages there have been various notions concerning the social value of different types of activity and correspondingly there have been changes in the volumes of the social spaces and areas in which activity has been judged as socially useful or antisocial. The forms of normative regulation have changed and the concepts of development in our society have altered.

For understanding the specific features of the present state in the various youth movements in our nation, it is essential to study the history of the question.

The first postrevolutionary years were characterized by the rapid development of all forms of independent activity: cultural, economic, social and political.<sup>2</sup> In speaking at the Third Komsomol Congress in 1920 giving the report "On the Program of the League," the First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee Lazar Shatskin said: "One of the most important reasons for the existence of our organizations is also the simple fact that the proletarian and peasant youth is endeavoring to come together not only according to the feature of its class status but also by age. Of course, the fact that youth organizations have encompassed all countries and the entire world clearly demonstrates that this is no accident but rather this has happened out of an instinctual desire of the young workers and peasants to come together. In the same manner that children play more willingly in a children's society, so young people study and learn more willingly in their own society, in their own organizations.... The particular psychological features of the youth, the prevailing of the feeling of youth over reason, the enthusiasm of youth, the readiness for self-sacrifice, a certain flippancy and generally many both positive and negative features necessitate in the communist education of the youth that special measures be taken which differ from the educational measures applied by the party to adult workers. If we are unable to think up any grounds or any reasons for the existence of our organizations and if we had not found them in the life surrounding us, we could say that the existence of youth organizations is a historical or natural fact, for it could not be an accident that the entire world is covered with an entire network of enormous, very developed, long existing and continuously developing youth organizations" [1, p 191].

At precisely that time, in the 1920s, a theoretical analysis was commenced on the role and place of youth movements in a socialist society and the forms of work with different youth groups were improved. However, this positive experience did not last long and by the beginning of the 1930s had virtually ceased. Not merely had the decade changed but also the concept of the nation's development and socialism. The adopted extremist regime caused maximum high rates of development but

sharply narrowed the social spaces in which development was possible and demanded new mechanisms of motivation. These were, on the one hand, very rigid repression and, on the other, myths about a joyous life which replaced real information on the state of affairs in the country.

By the mid-1930s, when all the levels of the administrative system had come into being and were working at full force, the legal forms of youth independent activity disappeared. The space of socially approved independent activity of the youth was narrowed to the confines of several official organizations. The alternative to these were the "Mishak Kvakin teams" and the "wolf packs," that is, the openly criminal milieu which became a reserve of professional crime.

Aggressively outlandish independent activity, illegal but well known and criminal but widely popular, remained in the 1930s and 1940s virtually the only rather widely found form of social independent activity.

At the end of the 1940s, there was a tendency for a rebirth of a seemingly completely forgotten phenomenon of illegal political independent activity of the youth [2].

By the mid-1950s, it had become clear that development along an extremist path was no longer possible as each new step forward cost too much.<sup>3</sup> After Stalin's death there began a gradual disassembly of the mechanism of extremist development. The clearing of the most odious prohibitive standards and rules from the social spaces provided an opportunity to resurrect legal forms of independent activity.

The end of the 1950s can be considered the start of the modern stage in the development of youth movements in our nation. The 20th Party Congress contributed to the process of the democratization of society and the economic reforms helped improve the life of the people. During the 1957 festival, for the first time in many years, the Soviet youth was able to mingle freely with their foreign contemporaries. Due to the improvement of the social atmosphere, the seemingly inexorable stereotypes were shattered. The development of social independent activity began to be recognized as a social need. There was the rebirth of the "new romantics" cultural movement which subsequently was transformed into amateur song clubs and tourist song clubs. The development of the "communard movement" was a response to the prevalence of the "wolf pack" and "black romantics" in the sphere of youth leisure. The student nature conservation teams an early prototype of the modern "Greens" declared war against poachers. But even these socially useful forms of independent activity did not gain official support. The problem was not merely that for many these seemingly now innocent independent movements represented a threat to our very foundations. There were virtually no legislative enactments which regulated independent activity and there importance under the conditions of the surviving administrative system was not so

great. The assessment and possibilities for the development of independent movements depended totally upon political decisions and the goodwill of specific political leaders.

The transition from an extremist mode of activity to normal conditions is always reminiscent of the movement of a pendulum: rapidly forward (to normal relations and forms of interaction)—the swing back (to the old “extremist” views and methods of decision-taking), forward—backward [3]. This was precisely the inconsistency in the approach to solving many social, economic and political problems, including youth ones. Often any innovation in the youth movement was associated with the “fashion setters” a flagrant and countercultural group of urban youth which became the unique symbol of the “first wave” of modern informal groups. The main achievement of the “first wave” was a significant improvement in social awareness, a breaking of the stereotypes from the 1930s and a practical demonstration that the appearance of additional (in addition to the officially existing) forms of youth organization not only did not undermine the bases of our society but met the essence of the occurring changes.

From the mid-1960s, the pendulum swung back and an attempt was made to hold it in this position as long as possible. The command-administrative system compensated for the loss of the repression mechanism (as a means of motivation) by an intense boosting of myth-making. However, in time the mythological “reality” in which we supposedly were to have long solved a majority of problems began to determine not only the attitude of social awareness to them but also the corresponding political decisions.

The “second wave” was determined both by internal (the breakdown of the administrative system) and external conditions. The “baby boom” had served as the demographic basis for the forming of a “new self-awareness of the youth” in the countries of Western Europe and the United States. From the mid-1960s, movements had been developing actively there and they in an unique form synthesized the ideas of countercultural and political independent activity (hippies and yetis). The youth movement also acquired an important component in rock music.

By the end of the 1960s, rock had become the most popular musical current among our urban youth. During these years in the major cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Lvov), domestic hip groups began to appear and a “system” began to form. The stronger the gap between the myths and reality, the more frequently the youth turned to independent movements which became a means for understanding oneself and the surrounding world, for relaxation and experience. Precisely in this period (the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s), a majority of the youth groups assumed the traits

of a “classic informality”: apoliticalness, quasi-internationalism, and an orientation to internal problems. Drugs and toxic substances (“chemistry”) penetrated the youth world and gradually became fashionable and these made it possible to “make trips to true reality”; all sorts of mystical, esoteric, transcendental teachings, beliefs and so forth assumed particular popularity.

The “second wave” was primarily groups of a counter-cultural and show-off sort (the hip system, rock-and-rollers and so forth) and based on borrowed models. Its other component was a group of aggressive independent activity. The traditional “wolf packs,” in being transformed under the influence of social conditions, produced a multiplicity of “mutant” forms, including: the “fanatics of sports clubs,” the “courtyard gangs,” the “hopheads” and so forth. The symbiosis of the “wolf packs” with their antipodes, the “communard groups” gave rise initially to the Berezka [birch tree] detachment and then numerous “repairmen,” “cleaners,” “yard-men” and so forth.

On the periphery of the “second wave” were groups of social independent activity including ecological (the student nature conservation teams) and ecocultural (like the Moscow Rodina [motherland] club). On the very extreme edge were the groups of political independent activity including the dissidents, pacifists and the nationalistic groupings. The small size and poor distribution of the groups of social and political independent activity can be explained, in our view, not so much by the counteraction by the administrative system (although this was rather strong) as by the influence of myth-making. In the mythological “reality” there simply remained no problems which would require independent activity as everything was going well and if you did see something bad, this was a particular case not meriting any attention.

It is important to note one other feature of this stage: the more the various forms of the youth movement developed, the longer they disappeared from the field of “official vision.” In the press and radio and TV broadcasts mention that we had other forms of youth independent activity in addition to the Komsomol became rarer and rarer.<sup>4</sup> Youth independent activities did not fit into the picture of the mythological “reality” and for this reason even mention of this was punishable.

By the mid-1980s, the social situation had become significantly exacerbated. The administrative system blocked a significant portion of the social space. Social time for a majority of groups if not stopping had sharply slowed down. The erosion of moral concepts led to a situation where illegal actions ceased expressing sharp non-acceptance all the more as such phenomena as prostitution, drug addiction and child vagrancy simply did not exist in the mythological “reality.”

Since April 1985, the party has begun implementing a new concept for the development of our society. Glasnost, as an alternative to myth-making in the motivation

system, has provided an opportunity to depict the true state of affairs in the state. However, the myth-making mechanism possesses enormous inertia and its breaking is a protracted, painful, but vitally necessary process. Recognition of the existing problems on the highest level, their analysis by the mass information media and debates on the question of the possibilities of resolving them have become a mighty stimulus for the all-round unleashing of all forms of social and political independent activity.

One can consider 1986 as the start of the "third wave" of youth independent activity as the existence of informal groups was officially recognized and there was an avalanche of materials on hippies, punks and rock-and-rollers on the pages of newspapers and magazines and the TV screens. The theme of the "informal groups" became a sensation in 1986-1987. The discovery of this "new reality" caused in the adult portion of the population a shock, stunning and indignation including the traditional words of the 1930s: "They (the punks and hippies) are the paid agents of imperialism." The journalists and sociologists were unable to describe how a "hard core" heavy metallist differed from a "moderate," a "major" from a "hophead," as it became apparent that all of these such hard-to-discover details were of little importance as the young people quickly and without compulsion moved from one group to another, frequently with the opposite orientation (from the "punks" to the "system," from the "system" to the "repairmen"). The distinguishing feature of the "third wave" was a tendency for the integrating of countercultural, aggressively flaunting groups of the "classic informal movement" into a certain unified "informal" environment which preserved the basic elements of the subculture of previous groups. But if the countercultural and aggressively flaunting movements are the most noticeable (the "birds of paradise" of an industrial society), the most important descriptive characteristic of the "third wave" is the active development of social and political independent activity. The course being carried out by the party of political renewal in our society and the wagering on the growth of the true activeness of all Soviet people have posed the problem of the development of these forms of independent activity as one of the most important and "crucial" for resolving other political, economic and ecological problems. With the development of glasnost, the social need for these activities was recognized, the forces capable of realizing this in the youth environment do exist however, with rare exception, the expected social effect was lacking. After the sharp increase in 1986-1987 of the number of political clubs, creative associations and interbrigades, seemingly the movement would broaden continuously. However, even by the end of 1987, it was clear that this was not happening for the following reasons.

In the first place, the groups of social and political independent activity included the most "mature" (socially, politically and psychologically) young people the number of which was not so great. Such independent

activities either repelled the remainder or did not attract as a consequence of orientation to other structures.

Secondly, legal regulation in the given instance was extremely imperfect and the question of whether an independent association would exist or not was determined on the basis of the good (or bad) will of the local authorities.

Thirdly, the absence in social awareness and in practice of the corresponding traditions and the low political culture of the youth led to a situation where the programs of the independent groups often suffered from extremism.

Fourthly, a competitor arose in the form of resurgent economic independent activities and the cooperative movement. The latter also met profound social needs, it had a dubious status in mass awareness and required young, enterprising and energetic persons. But in contrast to social and political independent activity, economic independent activity in the form of the cooperative movement virtually guaranteed tangible material goods for its participants.

Let us endeavor to assess the situation as a whole. At present, one can speak with confidence about a series of typological forms of youth independent activity.

*Aggressive independent activities* are a form based on primitive notions of the hierarchy of values, a minimum of culture and surviving into modern times in an almost unaltered form of the primitive forms of human development. The simplicity and openness of self-assertion give survivability to the given form. Variations of realization are also being transformed: from the village campaigns of "wall to wall" and jousting matches to the clashes of the modern "courtyard teams," the lamentably famous Kazan "gangs" to the most "civilized" form of competitions in paramilitary types of sports.

*Show-off activities.* These are based upon a challenge to existing standards, canons and rules both in the simplest areas of life (clothing, hair-do) as well as in the more complex (art, science). The show-off activities have as old a tradition as aggressive ones. The aim here is either to affirm affiliation in an elite group ("the student who does not have scars on his face from prohibited duels is as much of a nonentity as a hussar who has not participated in drinking bouts and has not had any amorous adventures") for the formation of a "new elite." For modern juveniles, external showing-off is often the only accessible (in terms of the level of development, psychological bent and social possibilities) form of making a statement, of self-assertion and finding an adequate environment of association. Precisely this explains the extended existence of the punk style and the popularity of the attributes of heavy metal.

*Cultural independent activities* are aimed not so much at shaping new artistic values as at creating a "culture for oneself." These also serve other forms of independent activity (for example, the subculture of the hippie and

punks, the "black romantics" of the criminal groups) but can also claim to create new artistic standards. One of the fundamentally new areas is computer independent activity ("hackers") the boundaries of which as yet are rather narrow (the working out of game and teaching programs) but as computer literacy spreads these will gradually broaden.

*Economic independent activity*, that is, activity aimed at the creation and realization of material groups for oneself, for one's and other groups. For many years, this form was the least popular and existed either in the form of so-called technical creativity or the private orchard and garden movement. With the restoration of cooperatives, the situation was sharply altered and in social awareness the taboo disappeared against a legal desire for material sufficiency and there began a sharp flow into cooperatives of young, energetic persons who were endeavoring to quickly attain real goods. The scale of the cooperative movement and its impact on the mood among the youth are rapidly growing.

In the context of *social independent activity* one can distinguish ecological, ecocultural, ethnocultural movements, internationalist ones, the mutual support movement and Miloserdiye.

Among the forms of *political independent activity* one should note the movement in the defense of perestroyka. Here one can encounter groups which differ in size, programs and methods of action. These are political clubs, social initiative funds and federative formations. The most popular variation is the People's Front in support of perestroyka (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Formations have also appeared which have aimed at being an alternative to the political changes being carried out in the nation (the best known example is the "Democratic Union"). Also clearly distinguishable is the human rights movement and the political self-education clubs (a characteristic example is the Political Club imeni N.I. Bukharin in Naberezhnye Chelny).

Legal reform inevitably creates prerequisites for the active introduction of various initiatives by the citizens into the space of socially significant activity. However, a qualitative leap is possible here only with the broad involvement of the worker youth in independent creativity. When a radical economic reform begins producing specific results, the independent activities of the population moves from the category of the desirable to the economically necessary.

#### Footnotes

1. This, in particular, is expressed in the terms: period of stagnation, revolutionary acceleration.
2. A serious study of the youth movements in the first postrevolutionary years is just beginning. S.N. Tikhomirov is working on this question in the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee.

3. Social practice has shown that extreme means make it possible to survive under the most complex conditions but they do not provide an opportunity for effective development.

4. An exception is to be found in the rare but extremely acute articles by Yu. Shchekochikhin in LITERATUR-NAYA GAZETA.

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#### Member of an Informal Group and the Law

18060006E Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Feb-Mar 89  
(signed to press 17 Apr 89) pp 63-70

[Article by V.S. Ovchinskiy: "Members of Informal Group in the Law"; Vladimir Semenovich Ovchinskiy is a candidate of legal sciences and deputy department chief of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and police major. He is a contributing author to our journal]

[Text] A skeptical, cautious and at times even sharply negative attitude toward the so-called informals [members of informal groups] is caused chiefly by their conflict with the law. Let us endeavor to take a look at how profound this conflict is, whether it can be "measured," to which of the informal groups this is most inherent and what can be expected here in the immediate future.

#### The Magic of Numbers

In numerous roundtable discussions of the informal movement and in articles and speeches by propagandists and responsible workers more and more frequently one sees the figure 6 percent. This is how they judge the share of those informal youth associations which have an asocial nature. The same figure can be encountered in the literature (see, for example: [2, 3]) and the statement by Ye.Ye. Levanov that the given data have been obtained by the Moscow Higher Police School causes

perplexity, to put it mildly. As far as I know, the co-workers of the mentioned institution have not made any such measurements.

From constant repetition the notorious indicator has become accepted and few have voiced doubt about it. Moreover, it seems that it is to the liking of many as certainly 6 percent is but a drop in the bucket and a growing pain which is scarcely worth paying serious attention to. The main thing is not to exceed the figure in other research, whatever the case.

I am profoundly convinced that the given data do not reflect the actual state of affairs. Without differentiating the respondents who are members of informal groups by the focus of their interests (positive, neutral or antisocial), one will not obtain any real information on the share of law breakers among them. If we take as 100 percent, for example, the young girls from the sewing circles, the members of ecological clubs and other informal initiative groups "put all in one clump" and in addition several fanatic hooligans who have accidentally fallen into the sampling, then the latter actually do give us the notorious 6 percent. It would be possible, for instance, to question the Komsomol aktiv and establish the proportional amount of those who consider themselves in the informal groups and then ascertain that there are no law breakers at all among them. Or one can go to the other extreme and select as the object of the study the informal groups with an antisocial bent and conclude that virtually all members of the informal group are law breakers. I am somewhat exaggerating the situation, but, unfortunately, such approaches to an analysis of the designated phenomenon are not a rarity.

To calculate the law breakers separately among the fanatics, the heavy metallists, rockers and so forth is also, in my view, a futile undertaking. Certainly the same young person can be a fanatic in a football stadium, a heavy metallist at a rock concert and a rocker on a motorcycle at night. And for some informal associations it is very difficult to find the parameters of the quantitative composition. For example, a significant portion of the youth was swept up in the fashion for heavy metal in 1985-1987, however is it valid to consider all of them heavy metallists? And how is it possible to measure the number of heavy metallists and the share of law breakers among them last year when the infatuation with "metal" had gone into decline?

In studying the informal groups, it is also essential to consider the regional features. With a similarity of certain features, a Muscovite rocker differs substantially from an Astrakhan, while a Leningrad punk differs from the Riga or Tallinn. For this reason, naturally, the conclusions made on the basis of research in one region cannot automatically be extended to another.

The permanent changes in the informal groups themselves require compulsory consideration of the time factor as well. It can be said with confidence, for

example, that any model of 1986 is very far removed from a representative of the given grouping over the last 2 years.

In assessing one or another informal association, it must also be remembered that it is often heterogeneous in terms of composition. Thus, among the same "Lyubers" [gang members from Luberetskiy Rayon in Moscow], the basic stratum is formed by a socially inclined young people who boast of belonging to the residents of Luberetskiy Rayon and which commits hooliganistic deeds. At the same time, here also are, on the one hand, juveniles and young people who are brought together primarily by power types of sports and in the "assets" of which are individual clashes with the heavy metallists, punks and hippies based on a distaste for imitators of Western culture and, on the other, socially dangerous young criminals who are in contact with the heads of organized criminal bands. Of course, these "components" do have points of contact in certain things (albeit a general rayon love for weight lifting) but at the same time in many regards they act completely autonomously. Here it is important not to rush in with generalizations such as the "Lyubers are mafia" or, conversely, the "Lyubers are a myth."

An accurate quantitative assessment of the informal law breakers is also impeded by the phenomenon of the perception and fixation of mass illegal actions. On the one hand, the fights of sports fanatics, the roaring crowd of heavy metallists at a rock concert, the rocker motorcyclists roaring down the night streets and the columns of Lyubers marching down the Arbat have a terrifying effect on an observer (including the researcher) and as a consequence of such an "effect" the impression is created of the complete criminal nature of all representatives of these groupings.

On the other hand, in accord with existing practice, in checking mass disorders, only an insignificant portion is apprehended and brought to the police bodies. There is even an inversely proportional dependence and that is: the more numerous the clashes and fights the fewer the number of persons apprehended. For example, if a fight involves around 200 persons, as a rule, not more than 30 are recorded by name on the police files. In other words, such "accounting" in turn leads to a distortion of the real picture, in the given instance, to a reduction in the share of law breakers among the informal group members.

All of this bespeaks the necessity of dealing carefully with the figures and carefully working out a method which would ensure a scientifically sound empirical analysis of the informal movement.

In my view, it is essential to start by elucidating two aspects: in the first place, how many informal group members are there amongst the law breakers (and not the reverse) and, secondly, are the infractions of the informal group members related to the activities of that association to which they belong?

Attempts to answer these questions were undertaken in research conducted in the Greater Moscow Area (VNII [All-Union Scientific Research Institute] of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]) and in Kazan (under the leadership of Ye.G. Baal, Academy of the USSR MVD). The obtained results were not uniform. Out of the entire contingent of juveniles registered by the inspectorate for juvenile affairs (IDN) of the internal affairs bodies for specific illegal actions, they isolated those who the IDN co-workers put as informal group members. In a majority of the surveyed Greater Moscow towns, the number was some 10-15 percent (basically, these were heavy metallists, breakers, rockers and groups formed along territorial lines), and in individual instances the informal group members included only single individuals of those registered with the IDN while in certain others (for example, in Lyubertsy), the corresponding indicator (that is, let us recall, the share of informal group members among the law breakers) exceeded the average level. As for Kazan, here up to 30 percent of the juvenile law breakers were members of informal groups with an antisocial purpose.

As the analysis disclosed, in Kazan many crimes were committed by juveniles as a result of the rigid pressure of group stereotypes of illegal conduct and were registered precisely for these actions. In the Greater Moscow towns, the picture was different as a majority of the informal group members who were law breakers were registered for illegal actions not related to belonging to one or another association. The exception is only the Lyuberts but even they do not have such a rigid dependence as do the Kazan juveniles.

We would point out that, as a rule, in the criminal cases and the administrative papers, the belonging of the law breakers to a certain informal group turned up extremely rarely. The investigator and the judge were interested primarily in only the fact of the crime itself or the administrative infraction. And this is understandable as punishment is given out not for membership in an association but rather for specific illegal actions.

#### **When Initiative Is Punishable**

Quite recently, when people began speaking openly for the first time about the informal group members, it was basically a question of home-grown hippies, punks, breakers, heavy metallists, rockers, sports fanatics and so forth. Now the accent has shifted. More and more frequently now, the object of attention is becoming the various social initiative associations. The spectrum of their activities is extremely wide and includes political, economic, historical, ecological, cultural and many other problems. Certainly, no one would dispute that "informal initiatives are an essential condition for the development of our society and a standard for the process of its democratic renewal [4]. So why then is the press full of comments concerning the conflicts of the members of informal initiative groups with police bodies or the local executive committees and, as a result, with the law? The reader would not believe his eyes when he learned how in

one city in a May Day parade they pulled away from the students the posters in support of perestroika and with appeals to combat bureaucracy; in another, the school children carrying similar posters were not even allowed on the street; how informal group members were apprehended and brought to the police for the fact that they were in favor of protecting a lake against harmful production wastes; how with fist fights they dispersed hippies who had unfurled political slogans; how directly in an auditorium at a session of an ecological club the police endeavored to apprehend a young scientist for the fact that he publicized data "for official use only" concerning water purity in a river; how they prohibited erecting a monument to Sergey Radionezhskiy; how, finally, they released dogs against the Afghan veterans who were marching to the site of the Eternal Flame [Unknown Soldier]!

When you "digest" such information, you feel like asking the sacramental question: "Who is guilty?" Very frequently you can hear that the police is to blame. It seems to me that this is a rather popular stereotype often instigated by the press. With a superficial view of the problem this may well seem the case. In actuality, police workers are involved virtually each time in conflicts with the informal initiative groups. But do they do this out of their own will? In essence, the slogan of the "all-Union elder" has been prophetic: "The police is the mirror of Soviet power." The law enforcement activities of the police have always mirrored the political situation of a specific historical period. The police merely carry out directives of the leading bodies of varying levels. Both a period of a criminal repressive policy, waves of completely unjustified liberalism and dealings with criminals—all of this is not a mere whim of the militia but rather work in carrying out the instructions of the authorities. For this reason, the conflicts with the members of informal initiative groups are not conflicts with the police but, as a rule, conflicts with the authorities. Of course, excesses between the members of the informal groups and the police workers do happen as a result of the political immaturity of individual co-workers and violations of legality by them. But this, in my view, is not the prime cause but merely a particular characteristic of the conflicts. Each of them is unique and unrepeatable but still at the basis always lies an opposition of views. This comes down at times to a simplified formula: extremism, rejection of different viewpoints, deafness to the arguments of reason and common sense, on the one hand, and official indifference, insincerity and a disdainful reticence to participate in a direct dialogue, on the other [5]. In life everything is much more complicated. I would isolate at least three most typical situations.

1. The completely legitimate demands of the members of the informal groups, without any manifestations whatsoever of extremism and illegal actions and a conservative, prohibitive stance by the local party and soviet bodies.

The supporters of the idea of the administrative system subconsciously see a danger in any informal initiatives as this does violence to the very nature of the system. The representatives of the informal initiative associations by all their activities urge the establishing of a psychological atmosphere whereby action would serve as the measure of a man's value and force one to look at the root of the phenomena which do not keep within a given framework and which fall out of the customary ranking. A fear of effort so inherent to the somnolent existence in almost life-long (in former times positions) largely, it seems to me, explains the given situation.

2. The democraticness of the local party and soviet bodies, a readiness to collaborate and support positive independent initiatives and a manifestation of vanguardism, extremism and illegal conduct by members of individual informal associations. The given situation to a significant degree is determined by the circumstance that the informal movements which have now been "legalized" existed in the "underground" in a warped form [6]. Naturally, such a position in the social structure could not help but cause a warping of awareness. Hence, the frequent hypertrophied presence of "ego" by certain informal group members, particularly the leaders, and excessively unsound claims.

3. A "programmed" acute conflict between the conservative ("force and don't allow!") views of the local authorities in the form of the command apparatus of the still very viable administrative system and the anarchy ("everything is permitted!") by individual informal groups in the form of the leaders or an active "core" with an extremist bent.

All the designated situations of the opposition of views lead ultimately to street actions such as large unsanctioned meetings and parades.

The exacerbation of conflict relations until recently was also aided by the different interpretations of the local temporary rules and instructions on conducting measures in public places. Actually, the realization of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of assembly, meetings, street parades and demonstrations gave way to a local, very voluntary or more precisely arbitrary creativity.

On 28 July 1988, the long-awaited Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Assemblies, Meetings, Street Parades and Demonstrations in the USSR" was finally adopted [1] and on 28 October 1988, it was approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. There can be no doubt that this was a step forward in the development of legislation. But we would like to bring up something else.

The Ukase has been given a clearly varied evaluation and this, undoubtedly, can be considered a victory over conformity which for decades had become deeply rooted in public awareness. Prior to the approval of the document by the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the press serious critical comments were published by prominent Soviet

lawyers who appealed to the deputies not to approve the Ukase [7; 8]. A sharp debate arose at the very session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This can be seen, in particular, from the comments by the Estonian Deputies E.A. Paap and P.P. Goryunov [9; 10]. The results of the voting show the lack of unanimity: in the Council of Nationalities 12 persons were against; 1 abstained; in the Council of Union 1 person was against [9].

Scientists and individual deputies were concerned primarily by the fact that the Ukase is based not on a registration but rather a permission principle. In my view, this is not the main contradiction. Ultimately with a permission system it is possible to organize the entire procedure reasonably. But at present it is far from perfect. For example, take the time for submitting a request to conduct an assembly, meeting, street parade or demonstration. In accord with the Ukase, this is to be submitted in writing to the local executive committee no later than 10 days prior to the designated date for conducting the mass measure (for a comparison: in West Germany an analogous request is to be submitted no later than 2 days, in France 3 and in Great Britain 6). But even now it is already clear that in certain situations, it would be impossible to defer a meeting or demonstration for 10 days. Time would be lost and it would be impossible to halt the tearing down of a historical building or prevent the discharge of toxins into a river....

Furthermore, as the Ukase states, if no application is submitted, the assemblies, meetings, street parades and demonstrations should be halted upon the request of the representatives of the authorities. The point is so categorical that it puts literally all unsanctioned mass measures outside the law. At the same time, world practice knows of compromise solutions. For example, in France, spontaneous manifestations may be halted at the discretion of the police prefecture usually only in those instances when they create a threat to public order. Now let us imagine that the Ukase had been adopted several months earlier. Then the citizens who had participated in spontaneous meetings to collect signatures for support of delegates to the 19th Party Conference and who had been rejected in a number of places by the bureaucratic apparatus would have ended up in the category of law breakers or, conversely, those who had demanded that the mandate be lifted for delegates who had not received the confidence of the people (as was the case, for example, in Yaroslavl).

To whom do such rigid restrictions come in handy? Certainly for the bureaucrats and conservatives for whom the Ukase helps organize one-way traffic on the social freeway. But, I think, the designated provisions are even more to the liking, as paradoxical as this might seem, to the extremist informal group members. In the first place, it is easier now for them to maintain an aura of "persecuted," and secondly, put in the same "box" are both the extremists of all hues as well as positively inclined members of initiative informal groups who have organized an unsanctioned meeting or demonstration. And, thirdly, as is known, among the members of

informal groups there are persons who have set out to directly combat the Soviet state and social system [11]. It is much better for them to bear responsibility for violating the points of the Ukase than for state crimes.

There is one other question which I would like to take up. The Ukase states: "The procedure for organizing and conducting assemblies and meetings is not to be extended to the assemblies and meetings of the labor collectives and social organizations carried out in accord with the legislation, their bylaws and provisions." This point in a way emphasizes that the document is aimed solely at the members of informal groups. But, on the other hand, the nation still does not have a new law governing the status of the all-Union and republic social organizations (the current one was adopted in 1932) and certain informal associations would clearly fall under such a status. What should be followed in carrying out mass measures: either the Ukase or the appropriate bylaws?

In a word, there are many insufficiently thought-out and contradictory provisions. This is why there are reassuring conclusions found in the report at the 11th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet given by T.N. Menteshashvili that the Ukase will remain in effect for a very short time and for this reason we must work out the necessary experience and then on the basis of its generalization make, if need be, the appropriate adjustments [9].

#### **What Lies Ahead?**

Each diligent researcher of the informal movement endeavors to guess its future. The forecasts have been very contradictory. The viewpoint has been stated, for example, that the process of the growth of informal associations is over, since there are no longer the social conditions for these associations to develop farther [12].

I feel that one does not have to be farsighted to predict a reverse trend: revolutionary changes in all spheres of social life and its democratization create real conditions for a further strengthening of the social activeness of the public, particularly the youth. And hence an increased number of different initiative groups is inevitable.

One can also note a trend toward the consolidation of the social initiative informal associations. This can be seen, in particular, from the growing movement of the People's Front in support of perestroyka. In addition, it must be considered that the development of the informal movement is certainly influenced by the achievements of scientific and technical progress (even now, informal computer clubs and game libraries are appearing) as well as the phenomenon of youth fashion which largely is of a transnational nature. One cannot exclude the appearance of informal groups of the most unexpected interest. For example, could one foresee the formation of a rather numerous (over 500 persons) interregional association of Indianists (fans of the North American Indians) [13]?

It is difficult to agree with those authors who forecast in the near future a decline in the groups with an antisocial focus, considering that "perestroyka itself, the deepening of democratization and the overcoming of the stagnation phenomena in all spheres of our life will be the reason for this" [14].

The rather widespread opinion that perestroyka has established "exceptionally favorable conditions" for reducing the crime rate and other infractions shows, in my view, a simplified understanding divorced from reality of the essence of the processes occurring. In actuality, the renewal of the moral atmosphere in society, the resurrection of Leninist standards of party life make it possible for the law enforcement bodies to work honestly. But it will not be any easier to fight for law and order because of this. No revolutionary social changes will occur without ancillary negative consequences. And society should be ready for the fact that the breaking up of the old economic mechanism, the destruction of conservative stereotypes in the mind, the collapse of political myths and supposed ideals and idols and the marked material stratification in various groups of the public create social tension. And this means antisocial actions are inevitable, particularly among the marginal youth, and there is a greater probability for the choice of conflict and illegal forms of behavior.

From a general forecast of the trends, let us move on to the particulars. Here a differentiated approach is essential. Let us begin, for example, with the hippies. Certain researchers see not bad prospects for this informal association "from the sociological viewpoint" [12]. The assertion is extremely debatable. In actuality, many former hippies have moved from a passive contemplation to a socially active behavior in ecological, socio-political and informal groups. But this is actually not the evolution of the movement but rather its degeneration and this is completely natural. When an opportunity appears to openly state one's viewpoint which does not coincide with the official one, then gradually the need disappears for passive forms of protest. One other informal grouping, the punks, also, in my view, does not have any prospects. In the first place, they now are very few. Secondly, these members of informal groups have "not taken root" in the youth milieu largely due to the spread of Nazi symbols in certain punk groups.

In the near future, I do not see among the members of informal groups the heavy metallists, wavers and breakers who will most probably "be dissolved" amongst the followers of new musical schools. The situation is more complicated with the rockers. Foreign experience shows the durability of this current over an extended time. Thus, the first motorcycle rock groups arose in the United States at the beginning of the 1960s and many of them still exist, and according to the data of American criminologists, in a number of states, they are an important element of the drug mafia. Crime-committing bands of rockers for a long time were a source of concern for the Japanese public. Such "survivability" is due to the fact that the rockers have powerful motorcycles which is a

means of mobile group travel and in addition with the ability to quickly incorporate fashionable youth amusements. Thus arose the punk rockers, the heavy metal rockers, the Nazi rockers and so forth.

It is far from the "technical" interest, as certain authors feel [12], that brings together "our" rockers. From the sociological viewpoint, this is a very simplistic approach. Judging from the situation in Moscow, for a majority of the kids the motorcycles are only a symbol of belonging to the group, just as are the meetings in the evening and at night, the "standard" clothing and, unfortunately, the open hostility to the police bodies and particularly the representatives of the GAI [State Automotive Inspectorate]. I feel that along with the territorial groupings (like the Kazan and Cheboksary) this category of members of informal groups will spread farther and not only in the large cities.

In the conduct of sports fans one can also see a natural pattern: after a series of mass excesses there begins a temporary lull and then everything begins again. The representatives of the law enforcement bodies, the Komsomol workers and the journalists basically emphasize the organizing of "fan clubs," viewing this almost as a panacea. In my view, this will not resolve all the problems. A majority of the fans can scarcely be considered as real ardent supporters. Not all can be driven into clubs. As for now the internal affairs bodies together with the Komsomol committees have been forced to spend a great deal of effort and time on preventing group fights between the fans. Will such a situation survive in the future? Undoubtedly.

In predicting the development of events, one must not discard a possible exacerbation of conflicts with the law by the informal groups formed on a nationalistic and chauvinistic basis. The events in Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan have clearly shown that the presence of such conflicts is very favorable to the corrupted clans for employing these as an instrument to destabilize the work of perestroika in the regions. Nor can one help but be alarmed by certain clearly nationalistic trends in the movement of the People's Front in the Baltic (as a whole, a positive movement).

Society should be ready for the possibility of increased conflicts between the members of informal groups who put forward civil initiatives and the conservative apparatus of the local authorities. It is difficult to refute G.Kh. Popov that broad democracy under deficit conditions and the complete power of the bureaucracy is capable of leading, on the one hand, to an outburst of anarchy and a march of the "lower orders" against the apparatus and, on the other, force the bureaucracy to develop a new mechanism for manipulating political life [15]. In either situation the members of the "initiative" informal groups must balance on a delicate wire separating illegal and law-abiding conduct. In order that confrontation give way to mutual understanding and the civil initiatives be clearly distinct from the antisocial and criminal ones, it is essential to have new legislative

decisions and, most importantly, new thinking both among the members of the informal groups and among the authorities.

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